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Governments are major economic players in all societies. The e⁄ect of ￿scal policy -
government spending, taxation and subsidies as well as public debt - on the aggregate econ-
omy and social welfare is of utmost importance and therefore subject to great controversy
amongst economists. Indeed, the literature on optimal ￿scal policy is impressively sizable
and has tackled issues as varied as the provision of public goods, choice amongst di⁄erent tax
instruments in deterministic and stochastic settings, tax competition, credibility issues in dy-
namic economies and redistribution of income across heterogeneous agents. The traditional
benchmark in all these normative analyses is the so called First-Best allocation. Accord-
ing to the First-Best theory of taxation, economies that are not subject to market frictions
should not be distorted by government intervention in the optimum. Therefore, relative
prices should be equalized to the respective marginal rates of transformation, which usually
calls for using lump-sum transfers only. In the absence of ￿rst-best tools or in the presence
of imperfections - such as externalities, informational asymmetries and missing markets that
call for an optimal distortion of market prices - economists have resorted to the Second Best
theory of taxation to prescribe optimal policy. If it is imperative to use distortionary tools,
the Second Best allocation is always such that the implied total excess burden is e⁄ectively
minimized. In dynamic economies, and in particular economies where investment decisions
are relevant, such goal is usually achieved by reducing long run distortions at the expense of
short-run taxation. The reason is simply that past investments are irreversible and thus a
non-distortionary source of revenue, whilst current investments are mostly discouraged by a
high taxation of future returns. Consequentially, the theory recommends a di⁄erent policy
rule for the initial and later periods. Notably, this is only feasible if private agents believe
that in the future all policy makers will comply with the currently announced ￿scal plan;
that is, if governments can credibly commit to the intertemporal policy that is optimal as
of date 0. That is arguably a very strong assumption, as even a benevolent government will
often ￿nd it optimal to reset its ￿scal programme as time unfolds.
This thesis consists of an analysis of di⁄erent aspects of optimal ￿scal policy in dynamic
economies, with a special emphasis on the consequences of dropping the assumption of full
commitment to future policies: the Third Best environment. As is now well known in the
dynamic optimal taxation literature - namely after the seminal contributions by Kydland
and Prescott (1977) and Fisher (1980) - the fact that governments choose their ￿scal policy
sequentially means that they cannot credibly make promises on future taxes that fall on
investments made today. When the future arrives, previous choices are bygones and namely
the previous investment decisions will have been translated into inelastically supplied factors
of production [such as physical and human capital]. It will then be optimal to revise past




promises and tax heavily such inputs so as to lower the remaining distortions. As such, each
government should set its policy as a best response to the expected, time-consistent, future
policy rules. This generally represents also deviating from the second best solution for the
￿rst period.
The aim of my dissertation is to provide new insights on how should benevolent govern-
ments optimally set their ￿scal plan in scenarios where policy is chosen sequentially [as it
is done in real economies] and to contrast the obtained results both to what we observe in
developed economies and to the Second Best. Furthermore, special emphasis will be put on
the design of the ￿scal constitutions and its role in alleviating the burden of policy discretion
over social welfare. For that, I will focus on two particular examples of the time-inconsistency
problem in intertemporal policy making, hoping that the lessons derived therefrom can be
extended easily to qualitatively similar problems.
In the ￿rst part of the thesis - Chapters 1 and 2 - I extend the literature on optimal
redistribution policy to a dynamic economy where skills are endogenously determined at the
initial stage of the life cycle. Namely, I consider an economy where agents ￿rst choose how
much to invest on their education - given their innate ability and initial economic resources
- and only later enter the labor market and supply labor. The optimal redistribution plan
for the entire life cycle of individuals is then characterized under the two mutually exclusive
assumptions: either governments can credibly commit to future policies or they cannot. I ￿nd
that in this economy an uncommitted utilitarian government setting taxes after individuals
have entered the labor market will have an incentive to over-redistribute labor income [sets
marginal tax rates too high] vis-a-vis the second best plan. In turn, that calls for ￿rst-period
subsidies to education that are regressive - i.e., render the life-time tax system less progressive
by bene￿tting relatively more those who will end up with higher income -, partially correcting
for the over progressiveness of future labor taxes. In going from Chapter 1 to Chapter 2, I
allow for greater ￿ exibility in the ￿scal instruments available to the government. Namely,
Chapter 2 is a study of optimal non-linear redistribution policy, whilst Chapter 1 includes
only linear taxation/subsidies. The novelty is that when a non-linear tax-schedule is allowed,
the time-inconsistency problem is exacerbated by the so called Ratchet E⁄ect, according to
which full redistribution is possible after education decisions are sunk because the government
faces no constraints to implementing the ￿rst best allocation. We show that tacit ￿scal
constitutions that are observed in real economies such as the independence of the tax code
from past schooling choices are potentially welfare improving.
The third Chapter - which is joint work with Salvador Ortigueira - analyzes Markov-
perfect optimal ￿scal policy in a neoclassical economy with physical capital and public debt.




The possibility of running de￿cits/surpluses in this class of economies is the major contri-
bution of the paper. Previous studies on Markov-perfect policy abstract from either public
debt, by assuming a government￿ s period-by-period balanced budget constraint, or from
physical capital, assuming that labor is the only factor of production. We show that the
steady-state Ramsey equilibrium (the second-best) is time-consistent. Moreover, for a stan-
dard parameterization of the economy we ￿nd a second, stable Markov-perfect equilibrium in
which income taxes are positive and public debt is higher than 50% of GDP. These numbers
are in line with those observed in most developed economies. The multiplicity arises from
di⁄erences in expectations over future policy. A feature common to the two equilibria is that
governments use public debt to reduce long-run tax distortions, as compared to the economy
without debt. The requirement to run balanced budgets in every period is, thus, identi￿ed
as a welfare-deterimental ￿scal constitution.
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OPTIMAL EDUCATION SUBSIDIES: COMPARING THE
SECOND BEST WITH A TIME-CONSISTENT
REDISTRIBUTION POLICY
1.1 Introduction
Most developed economies have witnessed an increase in pre-tax earnings￿inequality
during the last decades. Factors such as the rise of the skill premium and the increase in
European unemployment rates, especially among less skilled individuals, have been identi￿ed
as the major sources of such income disparities. As inequalities deepen, so does the demand
for social insurance. In fact, the share of welfare spending on total government budgets has
risen considerably and income tax bills are strongly progressive. These developments have
revived an interest in assessing the welfare consequences of income inequality and on the
uprising role of the welfare state as insurance provider.
The aim of this paper is to characterize optimal redistribution policy in scenarios where
governments￿commitment to future policies is restricted. In particular, our research will
focus on the role of education subsidies as an instrument for redistribution. Education
is understood as a principal determinant of labor productivity and hence of pre-tax wage
inequality. Under this hypothesis, current schooling policies are bound to have an important
in￿ uence over the future need for social insurance and optimal public choices. Moreover,
such in￿ uence is mostly relevant when policy making is made sequentially, i.e., when each
government maximizes social welfare given current state variables and regardless of what
was chosen in the past. Because policy making during a big time span - speci￿cally, from
youth to adulthood of an individual - is likely to observe this feature in real economies, it is
essential to understand the trade-o⁄s involved in dynamic redistribution policy under lack
of commitment.
The fact that income gaps appear empirically rooted in skill heterogeneity supports the
modern approach to optimal redistribution problems. In a canonical Mirrlees(1971) economy,
agents di⁄er in a single parameter - usually called "ability" - that summarizes di⁄erences in
labor productivity. This parameter, beyond the choice of individuals, is understood as the
major source of lifetime uncertainty. In a world of risk-averse agents and inequality-averse
1
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planners, redistribution policies are then desirably implemented. If there is perfect infor-
mation on the relevant idiosyncrasies, that comes at no e¢ ciency cost. Di⁄erentiated lump
sum taxes are su¢ cient to implement a ￿rst best allocation with perfect insurance. Mirrlees
seminal contribution is to provide a theory of second best taxation (with non-linear marginal
taxes on labor income) in this context, given the obvious agency problems that arise by virtue
of private information (non contractibility) on one￿ s own productivity. Perfect insurance is
not possible under asymmetric information because it would entail huge distortions on labor
supply. But the government can still provide partial income redistribution, and it does so by
optimally balancing the trade-o⁄ between equity gains and e¢ ciency losses of the necessary
distortionary tax-scheme.
In a recent paper, Werning (2007) explores the dynamics of income taxes in a neoclassical
economy where the distribution of skills is subject to exogenous shocks over time. A planner
chooses the time sequence of labor and capital taxes that maximizes social welfare, balancing
the bene￿ts and costs of the resulting income redistribution. The optimal plan is such that
marginal labor taxes are set higher when the income gap is wider and vice-versa. Intuitively,
the higher the level of inequality, the lower the weight of distortionary costs vis-a-vis equity
gains. Thus, labor income taxes become more desirable. They are more e⁄ective in providing
social insurance when the pre-tax wage gap is higher. Arguably, however, the distribution
of skills and productivity gaps are not only changing exogenously over time and depend to
a high extent on previous schooling choices. What role, then, for the education subsidies?
How should marginal subsidies to education relate to income taxation? Observably, in most
industrialized economies human capital investments prior to the entry in the labor market
are heavily subsidized, often at marginal rates above those of labor income taxes. Is this
optimal from a redistributive point of view? Does the time-consistency requirement a⁄ect
the normative prescriptions of education policy?
To answer these questions, we develop a life-cycle model of heterogeneous agents, who
di⁄er both in ability to learn and in initial wealth. Young individuals choose how much
consume and invest in their human capital, given their innate characteristics. They take
as given current schooling policy and form expectations about future redistributive taxes.
Later, when adults, they choose how much to consume and to work, given their acquired
skills, accumulated savings/debt and the tax schedule chosen by the policy makers. The
model is the simplest setting where one could explore the consequences of time-inconsistency
in redistribution policy when labor productivity is i)endogenously determined, unlike in a
traditional Mirrleesian setting and ii) depends - in the absence of social insurance - on a
realistic set of di⁄erent initial conditions: wealth and ability.
Pereira, Joana (2009), Essays on Time-Consistent Fiscal Policy 
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This project relates to a vast literature on optimal redistribution policy. Recent advances
in dynamic public ￿nance build on Mirrlees (1971) static framework by introducing an invest-
ment technology into the baseline problem. Albanesi and Sleet (2006), Kocherlakota (2005),
Werning (2007) consider neoclassical capital accumulation economies to determine optimal
dynamic taxation of capital and labor when skills are determined by idiosyncratic shocks.
Bohacek and Kapicka (2008) discuss instead optimal education policies in a human capital
accumulation with in￿nite horizon but a permanent shock to productivity. Their model
generalizes the analysis made by Bovenberg, Jacobs (2005) for static economies, reaching
similar conclusions on the role of education subsidies: if taxes are set optimally, education
subsidies play a minor role as redistribution tools; rather, they are set essentially to restore
e¢ ciency on education investment.
The problem of discretion in a Mirrlees setup with endogenous skills was ￿rst studied
by Boadway et al (1996). In their two-period economy, a time-inconsistency problem arises
because governments may observe agent￿ s productivity after education decisions are made.
Full redistribution is then costless in the second period, but it causes huge disincentives to
invest in human capital ex ante. A case for the high education subsidies that are observed
in developed economies is then made. Notice, however, that in such an environment the
lack of commitment is binding because redistributive taxes are optimally contingent on past
schooling investment (albeit indirectly, through the resulting labor productivity). In fact,
such policies are not at all in practice in real economies. Thus, we do not allow for this
possibility in our model as we restrict attention to linear taxation instruments. Instead,
the commitment problem will arise from a di⁄erence in initial conditions to the sequential
utilitarian governments￿problems: the distribution of skills and assets within the population
is not necessarily the same at the beginning of lifetime and as upon entry in the labor market.
We ￿nd that when governments can credibly commit to their preferred ￿scal plan in
the ￿rst period, having a life-cycle structure is not much informative vis-a-vis considering a
similar but static economy as the one studied by Bovenberg, Jacobs (2005, 2008): for a linear
earnings function, optimal marginal education subsidies are exactly equal to future marginal
labor taxes when the elasticity of complementarity between schooling and innate ability in
building up human capital is equal to one. Since labor tax rates reduce proportionately the
￿nal return on schooling, such policy corresponds to a zero net subsidy on human capital
investments. When there is complementarity (substitutability) between ability and schooling
in accumulating skills, though, the social planner will prefer to tax (subsidize) education in
net terms for redistribution purposes. What is new in our setup is the conclusion that initial
wealth di⁄erences are optimally redistributed away at the beginning of lifetime and that
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savings shall not be distorted at the optimum. Both results are consistent with Werning
(2007). In contrast, uncommitted governments ￿rst redistribute against di⁄erences in initial
conditions - ability and wealth - but later are only concerned with the resulting distribution of
acquired skills and assets. Previous sources of inequality and endogenous schooling decisions
are disregarded. Thus, insofar as schooling boosts skill heterogeneity, optimal labor taxation
is more distortionary ex post than ex ante. Likewise, ex post di⁄erences in savings would be
completely eliminated if the government could choose any savings tax (this also means that
debts would eventually be bailed out). From the perspective of the ￿rst period policy maker,
this redistribution choice balances the "wrong" trade-o⁄between equity and e¢ ciency. Thus,
education policy is used not only to restore e¢ ciency in human capital investment (in the
same way as in the commitment economy), but to restore the relevant trade-o⁄ between
equity and e¢ ciency from the beginning of life-time.
Education subsidies are redistributive insofar as they complement labor taxes when these
are chosen suboptimally. For a standard parameterization of our economy, we ￿nd this to
uphold an optimal marginal education subsidy above the future labor tax. Intuitively, the tax
set upon entry in the labor market is over-redistributive vis-a-vis the second best plan (that
of a committed government). Then, the best response of the ￿rst period government is a
compensation through an education policy that bene￿ts future high income earners relatively
more. In fact, Bohacek and Kapicka(2008) also support the case for education subsidies as
a tool for redistribution when income labor taxes are set exogenously. Their environment
is considerable more complex than the one in this paper but a parallel may be done to
their results. When labor taxes are set optimally, redistribution is carried out essentially
through those taxes. Subsidies to education are introduced mostly to restore e¢ ciency1.
By contrast, when labor taxes are set exogenously, education subsidies compensate for the
resulting suboptimality. Indeed, the main conclusion on education policy within our setup is
comparable. Only the source of ine¢ ciency is not an exogenous assumption on the level of
the labor tax rate, but the time inconsistency inherent in the dynamic redistribution policy
of utilitarian governments.
In the next section we set up our baseline economy, identifying the problem of the
individuals and their optimization conditions as well as the scope of government intervention
in the economy. Section 1.3 describes problem of the social planner with access to a general
set of linear ￿scal instruments, and lays out a primal approach to that problem, adapted
from Werning (2007). Sections 1.4 and 1.5 compare the optimal redistribution policy under
1In their paper the resulting subsidy rate is quantitatively small (3%) because costs of education are
already deductable from the tax bill. The remaining e⁄ect owes to the type-dependency of education costs
(as foregone earnings, which depend on type) and the e⁄ect that subsidies have on incentive compatibility.
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full commitment and under discretion for a general speci￿cation of individual utility and
technology. We then parameterize the economy in Section 1.6 and provide a numerical
example on the di⁄erences in optimal income taxes and education subsidies under each case.
Finally, Section 1.7 concludes.
1.2 The Baseline Economy
1.2.1 Individual Life-Cycle Problem
Our economy is populated by a continuum of individuals taking economic decisions in two
periods of their life cycle. In period 1, young individuals decide how to split their available
resources between consumption, investment in human capital and savings. They may di⁄er
in cognitive ability ￿ 2 ￿ and inherited resources a0 2 ￿. When they become older, in
period 2, individuals choose how much to work and consume, given an idiosyncratic labor
productivity which depends on previous schooling decisions. Thus, agents in this economy
are divided into a ￿nite number of types i 2 I = ￿￿￿ of relative size ￿i; which are de￿ned
as i ￿ (￿;a0): We will abuse notation and denote ￿i and a0
i the speci￿c characteristics
of an individual of (global) type i: Unitary labor productivity is then given by a function
  (￿i;si), where si denotes the investment in schooling previously chosen by agent i: The
skill production function   (:) observes positive diminishing returns to each of its arguments.
Furthermore, there is complementarity between schooling and ability -  s￿ > 0;8s - and
lims!0  s = +1:
All individual characteristics are assumed to be private information, and in particular
the cognitive ability ￿. Only its distribution across individuals is common knowledge. This
is a standard assumption in the Mirrlees taxation framework. In practice, it implies that
individual abilities are not taxable per se, but only as determinants of total labor income.




















with uc (:) > 0; ucc (:) < 0; ￿n > 0; ￿nn > 0: The assumption of separability is made
for simplicity, and does not a⁄ect the main insights of the paper. All agents share the
same preferences over the consumption of normal goods and leisure. However, individuals
with di⁄erent skill levels at the beginning of the second period derive di⁄erent disutility
from generating the same labor income. This follows from a production technology which
is assumed to be linear in labor (the only input) and perfect competition in the production
sector, so that all workers are paid their marginal productivity - yi = ni  (￿i;si).
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Education is costly in terms of money and is paid for in the ￿rst period. The cost may
include tuition fees, purchases of goods and services directly related to education and/or
foregone earnings during youth2. Thus, the sequential problem faced by the individual can















i + si + a1
i ￿ a0






i and V 2
i are the indirect utilities of a type i agent when young and when old,

















i (1 + r) + yi ￿ T 2
i :
(1.3)
1 + r is the exogenously given interest rate and T 1
i and T 2
i are, respectively, the net tax
bills of agent i in periods 1 and 2. We de￿ne their functional form bellow. Individuals neglect
the e⁄ect of their individual choices on aggregate variables such as the overall distribution
of income/skills, meaning that T 1
i and T 2
i are taken as given.
















































i (1 + r) + yi ￿ T
2
i
At this point, it matters the distinction between a scenario where the policy maker
announces the tax schedule for the whole life time and commits to it and one in which she
lacks credibility and therefore agents have to form expectations on what will be the tax
2It would be straightforward to include labor supply in the ￿rst period and model explicitly these foregone
earnings, as in Bovenberg and Jacobs (2005, 2008), Kapicka (2006) or Bohacek and Kapicka (2007). How
results are a⁄ected depends on the possibility or not of directly subsidizing/taxing time devoted to learning
and on the speci￿c way in which education time enters in the human capital production funtion   (￿), -
interaction between time and resources devoted to education and between education time and innate ability.
However, as long as labor taxes can be age-dependent abtracting from foregone earnings does not impact
our major conclusions about time-consistency in policy making.
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schedule for each period. Comparing redistribution policy in each of the two scenarios is
indeed the contribution of this paper. In the former, we may think of T 2
i as "known" to
all agents from birth. In the latter, agents form expectations on its future value which we
denote e T 2
i . In a rational expectations equilibrium, all agents correctly foresee the future tax
schedule and therefore necessarily share the same beliefs about future policy.
Marginal taxes are zero when the economy is either left to a laissez faire or if government
levies / transfers are lump-sum. In those cases, the allocation of resources within the economy
is fully e¢ cient as all marginal rates of substitution are equated to the respective relative
market prices.
Finally, notice that schooling investment is distorted not only by the net relative price
of education but also the net relative price of leisure in the second period . From (1.4)-(1.6),























strictly lower (bigger) than 1. When free borrowing/saving is allowed, (1.7) together with
(1.5) de￿ne a non-arbitrage condition for investment in assets versus schooling. Therefore,
savings￿taxes will also a⁄ect human capital accumulation.
1.2.2 The Government Problem
We consider a benevolent government choosing allocations - i.e., setting ￿scal policy - so














This government is conditioned by the set of available ￿scal instruments and the degree
of commitment to future policies. In this paper, we focus on a simple case where all ￿scal in-
struments are linear, meaning that only aggregate income, schooling investment and savings
are observable. Under such ￿scal constitution, we explore the optimal lifetime redistribu-
tion policy, contrasting the second best normative results to the - perhaps more realistic -
time-consistent solution. The extension to a non-linear redistribution policy is discussed in
Pereira (2008).
For simplicity, we abstract from any revenue requirements other than those created by
the distributional concern. Finally, governments may borrow/save in international capital
markets any amount B, bearing the same interest rate as private agents: r.
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Thus, welfare maximization is subject to the aggregate resource constraints (capital
letters denote aggregates over all types):
C
1 + S + A
1 ￿ A







(1 + r) + Y (1.9b)
A Walras law applies, meaning that when all individual budget constraints hold with
equality, the budget of the government also holds with equality.
1.3 Redistribution with Linear Policy Instruments
Take the simplest case where all ￿scal instruments are linear but the set of available
taxes/subsidies is otherwise complete. Governments may tax initial asset holdings, labor
income and returns from savings according to the ￿ at rates ￿a0, ￿y and ￿a1, respectively.
The tax bill may include also a lump-sum component ￿T t (T is to be interpreted as a
transfer) in each period, which means that ￿scal policy is not automatically distortionary.
Finally, the cost of investing in human capital is subsidized at the rate x, independent of the
schooling level or initial wealth. In sum, individual budget constraints are, 8i,
c
1










i [1 + r(1 ￿ ￿a1)] + yi (1 ￿ ￿y) + T
2: (1.11)
In this scenario, governments can independently set each of the implied margins in (1.4)-
(1.6). The only feature that distinguishes it from a pure Mirrleesian choice is that optimal
marginal rates of substitution are necessarily equalized across agents: MRSsi;c1
i = (1 ￿ x);
MRSc1
i;c2
i = [1 + r(1 ￿ e ￿a1)] (or = [1 + r(1 ￿ ￿a1)] if the government can credibly commit to
future policy) and MRSyi;c2
i = (1 ￿ ￿y) for all i: As such, the implied division of aggregates
fC1;C2;A1;S;Y g within the population is necessarily e¢ cient. Any distortions caused by
￿scal policy will be restricted to the determination of those four variables. That is because
linearity in the ￿scal instruments is equivalent to observability of aggregates only. Therefore,
if the government chooses to distort the economy because of equity concerns, it can only do
so over what it "observes" (what may condition the tax schedule on).
One may, then, formalize the government￿ s problem as a choice over aggregate allocations
instead of over tax rates. The approach is proposed by Werning (2007) in a dynamic economy
with idiosyncratic shocks to labor productivity and aggregate uncertainty. We apply it here
to our deterministic life-cycle economy with some necessary modi￿cations due to i) the direct
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impact that choices in the ￿rst period have on second period￿ s disutility of working, and ii)
eventual lack of commitment by the initial policy maker to future redistribution policy.
1.3.1 A Fictitious Representative Consumer
Following Werning (2007), we ￿rst establish an exact correspondence between the set of
￿rst order conditions from all individual problems - describing a competitive equilibrium of
our economy, for each tax policy - and those of the optimization program we set up bellow.
This will allow us to write individual allocations and relative prices as functions of aggregate
variables.
Consider ￿rst the competitive equilibrium arising in the second period, after di⁄erences
in skills are permanently set. In this period, all agents face the same marginal tax rate on
income. Thus, allocation of e⁄ective labor (yi) and consumption (c2
i) across the di⁄erent
types is undistorted, given the total Y and C2: That is, for each competitive equilibrium










































This de￿nes an optimal market division of C2 and Y , given the existing distribution of
f  (￿i;si)gi2I. The solution consists of a set of individual allocations fc2
i;yigi2I, of which
each element is a function of (C2;Y;f’2
ig).3 The weights represent the importance that the
allocation of an agent of type i has in the indirect utility of the "representative consumer"
- the market, in all - in the second period. They strongly hinge on the degree of income
redistribution in the economy and initial inequality, as is discussed in Section 1.4. To see
that the solution to (1.12) corresponds to the outcome of competitive equilibrium, take ￿rst
















3We will not explicitly include these as arguments of individual allocations when stating the social plan-
ner￿ s problem due to space constraints. There is, however, no possible ambiguity in reading the problem.
Wherever we refer to government optimization, individual variables are to be automatically understood as
functions of aggregates and market weights.
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A ￿ctitious representative consumer with utility function U2;m (C2;Y;f’2
ig) and budget
constraint C2 ￿ Y (1 ￿ ￿y) ￿ T 2 would, then, face the same relative price of consumption

























so that we obtain the same set of ￿rst order conditions as in the decentralized equilibrium.
Finally, one may substitute the tax rate in the individual budget constraint (1.11) by the











1 + r(1 ￿ ￿a1) + T
2￿
;8i 2 I (1.15)
which may be written exclusively in terms of (C2;Y;f’2
ig;T 2) and the initial distribution of
skills and assets.
A similar exercise is now done for the youth allocations. The market optimization in the
￿rst period involves not only intra-period felicity derived from c1
i, for each i, but also the
e⁄ect of si and a1
i on the continuation value V 2


























































i) ￿ V 2
i (￿i;si;a1
i;T 2
i ); with V 2
i (:) as de￿ned in (1.3). As of this period, fc2
ig;fyig







- aggregates to which the gov-
ernment may commit to (as determined by its tax policy) - or they are functions of the
foreseen, time-consistent,
￿






: Problem (1.16) is otherwise una⁄ected by the




ig) and then interpret the variables accordingly. Taking the


















= 1 ￿ x (1.17)
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i (1 ￿ ￿a0) + T
1￿
;8i 2 I (1.18)
To completely establish the correspondence between the competitive equilibrium in pe-
riod 1 and problem (1.16), however, one needs to consider in addition the individual choice of
savings for all types. We show in the Appendix that the latter implies that a decentralization




Lemma 1.1 In an economy with perfect capital markets where individual allocations are




i = e ’
2




i if there is perfect policy commitment and e ’
2
i equal to ’2
i in equilibrium.
In general, (1.19) implies that policy makers can only choose f’2
ig directly. In order to
implement the optimal aggregate allocation under perfect capital markets the government
cannot generate a di⁄erent weight of individual i￿ s utility in the market total utility (the
utility of the representative consumer). Since the decentralization is made through a system
of linear prices, all individuals face the same (expected) intertemporal price of consumption.
Would individual i have a higher weigh than individual j when young but not when old,
this would mean that at least one of the agents could improve her lifetime utility by chang-
ing a1
i and smoothing utility. Therefore, we could not be in the presence of a competitive
equilibrium. Notice that Lemma 1 relies on the time-separability of preferences but not on
separability between consumption and leisure.
The following proposition, adapting Proposition 1 in Werning (2007) to our model, sums
up the main content of this subsection:
Proposition 1.2 Given the initial distribution of net assets, f(1 ￿ ￿a0)a0
igi2I, an aggregate
allocation (C1;C2;A1;S;Y ) can be supported by a competitive equilibrium in our economy if
it is feasible and there exist market weights f’1
ig; f’2
ig and lump-sum transfers T 1; T 2 such
that (1.19) holds and implementability constraints (1.15)-(1.18) are veri￿ed for all i 2 I:
Individual allocations of young agents can then be obtained as the solution to problem (1.16),
whereas those of old agents derive from (1.12).
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1.4 Optimal Fiscal Policy with Commitment
We are now in the position of characterizing the second best social problem. Since the
planner may credibly commit to future taxes, she indeed chooses at date zero all lifetime





C2 = [1 + r(1 ￿ ￿a1)] (1.20)
from the "￿ctitious representative consumer" problem, we may rewrite (1.15) and (1.18) as



















i (1 ￿ ￿a0) + T
￿
;8i 2 I; (1.21)
where T is the present value of all lump-sum transfers. The committed government maxi-
mizes (1.8) subject to aggregate feasibility (also in present value) and market implementabil-
ity - conditions (1.21) and (1.19) - by choosing (C1;C2;S;Y;f’2
ig), the lump sum transfer
T and ￿a0 (which is not distortionary but can be redistributive). The implicit taxes that are
indirectly being chosen follow (1.14), (1.17) and (1.20).
Two comments are in order. First, the choice of market weights f’2
ig is associated with
the embedded degree of inequality aversion in the social welfare function. For our para-
meterization of the latter, social inequality aversion pertains to the concavity of the utility
function (1.1).4 The higher the social value of equity, the more similar these weights will be,
meaning that allocations tend to be more similar too (see, e.g., (1.13)). In turn, achieving
similar consumption levels across di⁄erently productive individuals requires setting relatively
high proportional tax rates and thus having lower aggregate income and consumption. If
these ine¢ ciencies would not follow from redistribution of income (e.g., if factors were sup-
plied inelastically), the optimal market weights would be chosen exactly equal to the Pareto
weights in social welfare - see last footnote -, which in (1.8) are set to 1 for all types. Second,
the lower is type heterogeneity, the weaker the insurance motive to achieve a high social
welfare. In the limit, when all agents are equal, optimal weights can be set to 1 at no cost,
as determined in the market, and the government raises lump-sum taxes only if there are
eventual revenue requirements (which we have ruled out in this paper).
The Lagrangian for the government problem, with ￿i￿i the multiplier of i￿ s imple-
4For a more general social welfare function
P
i2I ￿iUi￿i; it would also re￿ ect the structure of the pareto
weights f￿igi2I :
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Notice that ￿i represents the marginal social bene￿t of resources being assigned specif-
ically to type i agents; i.e., net of the positive e⁄ect through the correspondent increase in
total resources. Only when taxes/subsidies are non distortionary will this net e⁄ect be zero.
By optimizing with respect to T and ￿a0, one reaches the conditions
X
i





i￿i = 0 or ￿a0 = 1 (1.24)
Together, they imply that the second term of the Lagrangian is not binding; it will
disappear from (1.22). Each of them understates fairly intuitive results. (1.23) implies that
the marginal social bene￿t of increasing resources for a particular type is on average equal
to that of increasing economy-wide resources. Hence, the net e⁄ect has mean zero. In
turn, (1.24) implies that the government resorts to a full redistribution of observable initial
resources. As is well understood in the literature, optimal redistribution policy balances a
non-trivial trade-o⁄ between equity bene￿ts and e¢ ciency costs of distortionary taxation.
The latter can, however, be substantially reduced if consumption smoothing within the
population is attained mostly by virtue of a simple reshu› e of initial resources. ￿a0 is a purely
e¢ cient tax instrument, just like T; but the former serves the redistributive purpose whilst
the latter does not. When a0
i is constant, that is unpro￿table, and ￿a0 is indeterminate.5
Given (1.23) and (1.24), we now describe the necessary conditions for optimality in the
5In practice, (1.24) implies that initial wealth heterogeneity plays little role in the optimal redistribution
plan. Would we have a0
i = a0; 8i; the remaining results of the paper would be una⁄ected. However, we
chose to maintain it here for the sake of generality and because we are currently working on an extension of





i2I, in which the heterogeneity assumption no longer is inconsequential.
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WY =WC2 = (1 ￿ ￿y)
(1.25)
Upper bars are used to emphasize that these are tax choices the government pre-commits
to.
W (:) is to be interpreted as the pseudo social welfare function- social utility net of
binding implementability constraints -, which the government maximizes subject to the in-
tertemporal resource constraint. The system on left hand side of (1.25) is the social parallel
to (1.4)-(1.6), the di⁄erence being that governments care about before tax prices and have a
di⁄erent objective function. Thus, distortions are imposed to private choices whenever the
social marginal rate of substitution between two of the goods - (aggregate) consumption,
leisure and schooling - is di⁄erent from that implied in the market (the ￿ctitious represen-
tative consumer). For instance, individual supply of labor is optimally distorted because
the government valorizes less higher aggregate consumption (as opposed to a more equal
consumption) than the market, where there is no intrinsic preference for equity. The social
marginal rate of substitution of consumption for leisure in the second period will then be as
low relative to that of the market, as more inelastic the labor supply. The other margins
have similar interpretations.6
Education Policy under Commitment
Werning (2007) presented similar expressions for the dynamic taxation of capital and
labor7. What is new and of special interest to us in this paper is how (1 ￿ x) is determined;
namely, how it relates to other distortions imposed on the economy and which role it plays
in the redistribution plan. We can write it as


























Ignore for the moment the last term. Subsidies to education will, on the one hand,
exactly compensate for the distortions induced by taxation of labor income - (1 ￿ ￿y) -, as
6It is worth noting that expressions in (1.25) are not explicit formulae for taxes/subsidies, as the ratios
involved in it depend yet on endogenous variables.
7See also Atkeson, Chari and Kehoe (1999) for an homogeneous agents - in￿nite horizon economy.
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it is through labor income that the investment on schooling meets a return. Such result is
widely documented in Kapicka(2006), Bohacek and Kapicka(2008) and Bovenberg and Jacobs
(2005). Additionally, x decreases when the optimal savings tax is higher, as investment on
education becomes a more attractive form of transferring resources across time. This was
to be expected by looking at the non-arbitrage condition (1.7). Since the government can
always resort to lump-sum taxes/transfers in the ￿rst period to cover revenue requirements,
it can fully compensate for the ine¢ ciency costs caused by these two indirect distortions over
the investment on human capital by simply introducing the inverse wedge.








: To interpret it, take the individual optimization problem. The marginal
rate of substitution between investment in education and leisure is given by ni s (￿i;si).
It tells us by how much will labor income, and thus utility derived from consumption and
leisure, rise at the margin after investing in education. In terms of the aggregate allocation,
such margin will only di⁄er from the planner￿ s and the market￿ s points of view if schooling
bene￿ts high and low types at di⁄erent rates. Namely, if the elasticity of complementarity
between schooling and ability is higher (lower) than 1, the rate of increase in productivity
grows with innate ability and the government will value education less than the market. In








< (>)1 - and education will be net taxed (subsidized) for redistributional
reasons. The insight is discussed extensively in Bovenberg and Jacobs (2008)8.
In sum, this subsection extends previous results by Bovenberg, Jacobs (2005, 2008) and
Reis (2005) who study a similar redistribution problem, with optimal education policy and
income taxation, in static economies. Because the government has full commitment and
there is no uncertainty in the model, redistribution policy set in the beginning of lifetime
simply insures ex ante against initial heterogeneity and it does so by ￿xing at date zero the
whole life path for individual allocations. The fact that they are spread in two periods is
inconsequential for education policy.
Time Inconsistency
Assuming that governments commit to such redistribution policy is, arguably, very re-
strictive. From the moment when agents take their major schooling decisions, during their
youth, to the span of their participation in the labor market there is a considerable time
interval. Suppose the utilitarian government is allowed to re-optimize at the beginning of the
8The authors also discuss the impact on optimal education subsidies of a non-unitary elasticity of comple-
mentarity between labor e⁄ort and schooling in the earnings function. For our speci￿cation - y =   (￿;s)n
- this elasticity is equal to 1.
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second period. It will by then be faced with a single period Mirrleesian economy where the
population is characterized by a known distribution unveri￿able skills f igi2I, not necessar-
ily equivalent to that of the pre-education innate abilities f￿igi2I. The scope of heterogeneity
may have waxed or waned. Furthermore, the social objective function will be di⁄erent; it is
now simply the average utility of adult individuals. Thus, the redistribution problem changes
as time unfolds.
Preferred taxes as of the beginning of the second period generally di⁄er from what
was optimal one period before, a constraint that the ￿rst period policy maker faces in the
absence of long term commitment. In other words, a time-inconsistency problem arises
which is particularly tied to the assumption of utilitarianism: what matters at each stage of
policy revision are the established sources of heterogeneity - e.g. f igi2I - and how best to
redistribute them away; not where do they come from.
What is then a time-consistent redistribution policy in this model? We turn to the
no-commitment environment in the next section.
1.5 Optimal Fiscal Policy without Commitment
Three features distinguish the problem faced by the government (re)optimizing at the
beginning the second period from that of a committed planner who chose ex ante all lifetime
allocations. One, education decisions are now sunk, which is equivalent to saying that the
elasticity of labor supply is perceived lower than in the ￿rst period. There is a strong comple-
mentarity between early investment in human capital and hours of work during adulthood.
Thus, the opportunity cost of leisure increases in the second period because productivity
  has increased with education. Two, inequality is now deeper because  ￿s > 0: As such,
redistribution policy is more prone to sacri￿ce e¢ ciency in favor of closer consumption lev-
els across types. Implementability constraints will, therefore bind di⁄erently for all types.
Three, decisions on savings are also sunk at beginning of the second period. If there is
heterogeneity in a1
i, and by a similar argument to the one following equation (1.23), ￿a1 now
becomes a non distortionary tool for redistribution.
If we allow the government to freely choose ￿a1 at date 1, it is clear that the optimal
social choice at that point will be ￿a1 = 1: Consequently, every agent will choose to borrow
in￿nitely, as she will then be completely bailed out in the future. Therefore, in order to
have an interesting comparison with the second best solution in our stylized economy we
need to impose either a limit to the much agents can borrow or the much governments
may tax. A borrowing limit would always be trivially hit by all agents, however, changing
the nature of the social programme: even in the absence of any equity concerns it will be
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optimal to distort the price of schooling and labor (see e.g. Jacobs (2002)) so as to facilitate
consumption smoothing across the di⁄erent individuals. Hence, we will impose instead a
limit to the much governments can tax savings and we set that limit to zero without loss of
generality (they would otherwise choose whatever limit we might impose).
Because we assume that the consecutive governments are benevolent, there is no con￿ ict
in what concerns second period equity goals. If it was not for the implementability con-
straints, both governments would have all marginal utilities equalized across agents. But
they disagree on the appropriate balance against e¢ ciency losses. We argue in this section
that subsidies to education then have a redistributive role, in that they not only compen-
sate for the indirect distortions caused by labor income taxes but will be used by the ￿rst
government to e⁄ectively redistribute against the initial shock ￿ and not di⁄erences in  :
Time-Consistent Redistribution Policy: Adulthood
The time-consistent problem of the government may be solved backwards. In the last
period, the economy inherits the previously determined distribution of labor productivity























which the government maximizes over (C2;Y;f’2
ig) and T 2. All distortionary e⁄ects on
past decisions are disregarded, as they are irrelevant to the current period problem. Further-
more, the government is constrained by aggregate feasibility and the set of implementability







































































































(1 + r) + Y ￿ C
2￿
The choice of T 2 is dictated by a similar condition to (1.23), turning the Lagrangian
independent of T 2: Thus, parallel to Section 1.3, ￿W2
Y=W2










= (1 ￿ b ￿y) (1.28)
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The interpretation of this ratio is the same as under commitment. The higher the
gap between marginal rates of substitution of consumption for leisure to the utilitarian
government and to market, the bigger is ￿y: However, as is made clear in the example bellow
(see also last subsection of the Appendix), the resulting policy rule for labor income tax is
di⁄erent for two reasons. One, labor productivity levels are now ￿xed, so the government no
longer considers the complementarity between Y and S (that is, ignores the e⁄ect of Y on
the ￿rst period implementability constraints). Consequentially, the optimal social balance
between equity - more equal c2
i - and e¢ ciency - higher Y and C2 - changes, as the e¢ ciency
costs of taxation decrease. In the market, instead, commitment is not an issue because there
is no intrinsic taste for redistributing resources. As a result, the optimal tax rate b ￿y tends to
be higher than ￿y so as to bring the equilibrium closer to a more equitable outcome. Two,
unlike ￿y, b ￿y is going to be a⁄ected by the heterogeneity in asset holdings at the beginning
of the second period because there is now a missing ￿scal instrument to tax savings. The
￿scal authority would like to bail out debtors and expropriate savers. Not being able to
do it, b ￿y is bound to depend on the correlation between individual asset holdings and their
skills. Intuitively, one would expect that a high correlation between the two would render b ￿y
less e⁄ective as wealthier individuals have a lower marginal utility of income and therefore
less willingness to work for the same  . If, on the contrary, the most productive individuals
arrive at period 2 with lower savings - e.g. because they have borrowed more to invest on
education - we could expect optimal b ￿y to increase even more vis-a-vis ￿y: Nevertheless, the
expressions for ￿y and b ￿y are su¢ ciently involving that a clear cut comparison of the two is
impossible9.
Time-Consistent Redistribution Policy: Youth
In this period, governments regard the ￿nal distribution of skills and savings as the
outcome of endogenous decisions, therefore taking it into account when setting ￿scal policy.
They are, however, restricted by the discretion of the next policy maker, who is also an
utilitarian, and the inability to redistribute initial resources (￿a0 = 0) and set market weights
f’1
igi2I freely. The social problem is thus con￿ned to choosing (C1;A1;S), B and T 1; so as
















subject to the implementability constraints (1.18), the conditions on the market weights
(1.19), and the future policy rules - future redistribution policy as a function of the inherited
9See last section of the Appendix.
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distribution of f i;a1
igi2I and A1 +B. Finally, the redistribution programme faces an addi-
tional implementability constraint associated with the inability to set the future tax rate on





















































































































When choosing education policy, the government takes the expectations of private agents
on future policy as given. Whereas the existence of perfect private capital markets impose
condition (1.19), the Euler equation (1.5) with zero taxes completely pins down fa1
igi2I
as a function of current and expected redistribution policy, as part of the set of necessary
conditions for a competitive equilibrium. In the second best programme it was still possible
to indirectly set fa1
igi2I through the choice of ￿a1.







Combining it with (1.17) and rearranging terms, the optimal education subsidy rate becomes:



























The elements in (1.30) are the exact parallel to those in (1.26), the same way that income
taxes have similar expressions under commitment and discretion. However, f W2
Y is not part of
the ￿rst government programme, meaning it is distinct from W 2
Y in (1.26). The ￿rst policy
maker does internalize the fact that f W2 ultimately depends on S, but this derivative is
embedded in W1










= e ￿ no longer corresponds to a fully controllable ￿scal price, but to
a social intertemporal discount which depends on the initial choice of aggregate consumption
and expectations about future policy.
In contrast, from the market perspective the only thing that has changed is that future
variables are now foreseen, rather than known. The derivatives of Ut;mjt=1;2 with respect to
S and Y - are thus the same as in (1.26) after expectations realize. Therefore, the relative
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marginal rates of substitution - to the market versus the utilitarian society - are bound to
change.
One would ultimately like to have a clear contrast between x and b x. Once more, given
the complexity of the terms involved in (1.26) and (1.30) - evident from the Appendix - that
is not possible. This is why we now turn to a familiar parameterization of the model that
allows for a neater comparison of second best with time-consistent policy.
1.6 A Parameterized Economy
In order to illustrate the di⁄erences between commitment and discretion in the economy
analyzed above, we particularize the results for an economy which functional forms allow for
a near closed form solution. We assume an utility function of the form (1.1), with u(c) = c1￿￿
1￿￿
and ￿ (n) = ￿n￿
￿ ; implying a Frisch elasticity of labor supply of 1
￿￿1: Skill technology is given
by   (￿;s) = ￿

















  (￿;s) = ￿
￿s
￿ (1.31)
0 < ￿ 6 1; 0 < ￿ < 1; ￿ > 1; ￿ > 0:
In this case, the allocation problem of the pseudo representative consumer has a simple














yY si = !
i
sS:
Derivations and expressions for !i
c; !i
s and !i
y may be found in the Appendix. These
shares are functions of the parameters of the model and the market weights, which are taken
as given by individuals. Notice that the individual allocations do not depend on A1. Both in
the commitment and no commitment solutions, the fa1
igi2I may be obtained as functions of
the other policy variables. As the same happens with the public savings B, the optimality
conditions for these two aggregates are actually the same - there is no increased bene￿t
in using public debt/savings when agents can perfectly smooth consumption in the private
market.
Redistribution Policy Under Commitment
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Proposition 1.3 For the parameterization (1.31) of the economy laid out in Section 1.2,
and when governments may credibly commit to future ￿scal policy, optimal taxes on savings
are set to zero - ￿a1 = 0 - and the optimal labor income tax and subsidies to education are
given by:













































i + ￿i￿ (1 ￿ ￿)
i
￿i
with ￿i de￿ned as in (1.22).
Proof. See Appendix.
Committed governments dispose of savings taxes and use instead labor taxes to redis-
tribute income. Distorting the intertemporal price of consumption brings no additional
insurance against initial inequality. Neither does it help alleviate the distortionary e⁄ects
of labor tax rates due to the separability between consumption and leisure. Thus, for this
parameterization of the utility function, there is no intertemporal distortion.
The simple relation between the labor tax rate and education subsidies is a consequence
of the technology for skill accumulation having an unitary elasticity of substitution between







in (1.26) is then equal to 1. Further-




￿y balances the trade-o⁄between the bene￿ts of redistributing labor income and its dis-
tortionary costs. As mentioned before, at the beginning of lifetime one shall think of labor
supply as being composed of time not enjoying leisure and resources not allocated to initial
consumption, both of which having the purpose of increasing labor income. The elasticity
of this "composite" labor supply is bigger than the regular one and thus the e⁄ective redis-
tribution costs for the same ￿ are higher. This justi￿es the (1 ￿ ￿) term in the denominator,






i + ￿i (1 ￿ ￿)
￿
decreases with risk aversion ￿, welfare derived from in-








in ￿, a big elasticity of labor supply - low ￿ - implies high social costs of taxation and hence
a lower optimal ￿y: Likewise, the impact of a change in returns to schooling in the optimal
labor taxation depends on how ￿￿cov (!i
s;￿1
i) changes with ￿. A bigger ￿ generates, in equi-
librium, higher aggregate investment on schooling, S, and thus higher Y for the same total
hours worked in the economy. However, the ex-ante elasticity of labor supply (the elasticity
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of the "composite" labor supply) also increases, counteracting the ￿rst e⁄ect. Wether the
optimal tax increases/decreases when ￿ is higher is, thus, a numerical question.
Time Consistent Redistribution Policy
If second period governments have discretion over ￿scal policy, they set redistribution
policy after schooling choices were made, and hence labor supply is no longer regarded as the
"composite" of foregone leisure and ￿rst period consumption. Rather it is simply foregone
leisure, as in a classical Mirrlees environment. Therefore, the relevant elasticity is the pure
Frisch elasticity of labor supply, determined by ￿: Moreover, the government is hampered
by the impossibility to redistribute away di⁄erences in a1
i: The optimal choice of labor taxes
is thus qualitatively di⁄erent from the commitment case. Proposition 1.4 states the optimal
formulas for b ￿y and b x:
Proposition 1.4 For the parameterization (1.31) of the economy laid out in Section 1.2,
when governments cannot credibly commit to future ￿scal policy and may not levy taxes (bail
out) on savings (borrowing), the optimal labor income tax and subsidies to education are
given by:












































































































i are the multipliers of the implementability constraints for agent i in (1.29)
and (1.27).
Proof. See Appendix.




with the multipliers ￿1
i and ￿2
i will certainly di⁄er because the latter do not coincide and
equilibrium market weights change. Yet, for the same covariance between the share of labor
Pereira, Joana (2009), Essays on Time-Consistent Fiscal Policy 
European University Institute
 
DOI: 10.2870/105671.6. A PARAMETERIZED ECONOMY 23
income and ￿2
i, it is now less costly to tax labor. The denominator is then higher, suggesting
that b ￿y will tend to be higher than ￿y. Also, b ￿y is now a⁄ected by the heterogeneity in
savings. Suppose that agents who are more skilled and therefore generate a higher share of







> 0 - as is the case in the example bellow -, we must have cov (a1
i;￿2
i) < 0,
contributing to the rise in b ￿y. When the opposite happens (both covariances are positive),
for instance due to a high correlation between ￿i and a0
i, the optimal tax on labor decreases
because of a wealth e⁄ect over labor supply decisions (labor supply becomes more elastic).
Subsidies to education, as in the commitment case, compensate for the indirect distor-
tions that labor taxes impose. Nonetheless, their net value depends on how !i
s co-varies
now with ￿1
i and e ￿
2
i. Since for our parameterization !i
s = !i




















< 0: Thus, the optimal education







i2I relate. Note that these are multipliers to the same
present value implementability constraint, which is perceived di⁄erently by the two govern-
ments, not only because of schooling and savings ex-ante endogeneity and ex-post exogeneity






i2I measure the excess burden of taxation in the second period and f￿1
igi2I have a
similar interpretation for schooling subsidization. Only when the multipliers are inversely
correlated will net education subsidies (b x > e ￿y) be socially desirable.
Calibration
We now calibrate the parameters in the utility function, skill technology and initial
heterogeneity. Given the stylized form of our economy, we do not attempt to exactly match
properties of the data. Instead, we choose a meaningful calibration that allows us to get
a quantitative notion of the direction of our results. Hence, in what concerns the utility
function we set ￿ = 1 (logaritmic utility in consumption), ￿ = 5 (implying a Frisch elasticity
of labor supply equal to 0.25, as in Bohacek, Kapicka (2008)) and normalize ￿ = 1. The
skill technology will be linear in cognitive ability ￿; i.e., ￿ = 1. The curvature with respect
to the level of education - ￿ - is set to di⁄erent levels for comparison purposes, ranging from
0:3 to 0:7: Finally, ￿ = (1 + r)￿1 = (1 + 0:04)￿1:
The economy is populated by two types only: H and L. The initial abilities ￿H and ￿L
are such that their average is ￿xed to 1 and we make the ratio ￿H=￿L grow to see the response
of optimal tax rates and education subsidies to a rise in inequality as of the beginning of
lifetime. As we derived above, heterogeneity in initial resources under the second best is
always fully redistributed, and is thus inconsequential for the other policy variables. As
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such, to keep results comparable under the commitment and no-commitment solutions (as
we arti￿cially imposed zero taxes on wealth in the latter), we assume in this example that
all agents start with the same a0
i = A0: The precise level of A0 is qualitatively unimportant
and we thus set it to zero.
The Figures in the Appendix display optimal income taxes and education subsidies under
the two commitment scenarios. In the second best environment, taxes grow with initial
inequality in ￿; but tend to an upper bound well bellow 100%. Education subsidies naturally
match labor income taxes, as derived above for our particular parameterization. Importantly,
whilst at low levels of inequality a higher return on schooling in the skill technology allows
for higher taxes and thus more redistribution, when inequality is too high, the excess burden
becomes excessive. As the "composite" elasticity of labor supply increases with ￿, optimal
tax rates at high inequality levels are lower when ￿ is higher.
The present value of lump sum transfers is positive at all considered (￿;￿H); regardless of
government credibility. That means both that tax collection in the second period more than
covers ￿rst period public expenditure in education and that income taxes are progressive.
Overall, the ￿scal plan is the more progressive the higher is ￿y and the lower is x.
As expected, labor taxation is higher under lack of commitment because the endogeneity
of skills is not internalized. Moreover, the e⁄ect of an increase in ￿ on the optimal tax level
is stronger for the initial levels of inequality and does not reverse at high levels, precisely
because the internalized elasticity of labor supply is simply the Frisch elasticity. In this
scenario, it is actually the case that for ￿ = 0:7 taxes approach quickly the 100% level (b ￿y
never actually reaches it, but the numerical di⁄erence is negligible). At that stage aggregate
consumption is virtually zero. In all, from a second best perspective, there is too much
redistribution when taxes are chosen upon entry in the labor market and therefore welfare
is lower.
Finally, education is always subsidized in net terms for our calibration. This means that
governments at the beginning of lifetime consider the future tax rate as over redistributive,
and thus use a higher-than-e¢ cient subsidy to education that bene￿ts relatively more future
high income earners to compensate for such over-redistribution. Given that the model does
not allow for a fully closed form solution, we cannot go beyond numerical simulations to
assert the generality of such proposition. However, for a reasonable range of parameter
values, we consistently found this pattern.
Both Bovenberg, Jacobs (2005) and Bohacek, Kapicka (2008) show that second best
redistribution policy has education subsidies/taxes playing a redistributive role when labor
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taxes are set exogenously10, and hence suboptimally. The interpretation here is equivalent,
only the source of suboptimality is not an arbitrary value assumed for ￿y but the lack of
commitment. Therefore x is also chosen to o⁄set the unavoidable ine¢ ciencies associated
with an ill-chosen labor tax.
1.7 Conclusion
Previous literature on optimal redistribution policy with endogenous skills has found
that education subsidies should be used in the ￿scal plan mostly to restore e¢ ciency in
human capital investment. In this paper, we characterize optimal redistribution policy in
a life-cycle economy where agents di⁄er in their innate ability and initial wealth. In the
considered setup, as expected, pure second-best policies (under government commitment)
basically resemble what has been obtained in literature for static economies, namely in what
concerns education policy.
Our main contribution is to drop the assumption of government￿ s commitment to future
policy in this context. We ￿nd that the lack of commitment is restrictive and curbs the
extent to which labor income taxes insure optimally against initial inequality. In particu-
lar, we showed with a standard parameterization of the economy that the ￿scal authorities
"over-redistribute" labor income, as the second period idiosyncrasies are wider than ￿rst
period ones and the elasticity of education choices is disregarded. Thus, governments at the
beginning of lifetime see future labor tax policies as not adequately balancing the ex-ante
trade-o⁄ between equity and e¢ ciency. Education policy then plays a redistributive role
insofar as it does not simply restore e¢ ciency in investment decisions but partially undoes
the excessive redistribution carried out in the second period.
1.8 Appendix
Proof of Lemma 1:
The ￿rst order conditions to problems (1.12) and (1.16) with respect to the individual






















i = ￿A = U
1;m
A ; 8i
10Bovenberg and Jacobs (2005) consider a scenario where labor income cannot be taxed, whereas Bohacek
and Kapicka (2008) set the labor tax rate to a ￿ at 40%.
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Take the problem of an agent i, who chooses allocations for the ￿rst period, forming















i [1 + r(1 ￿ ￿a1)]: The margin between consumption today and consumption









= 1 + r(1 ￿ e ￿a1):
Since
























i is necessarily a constant and because market weights are normalized to
have an average of 1, ’1
i = e ’
2
i;8i:￿
The ￿ctitious representative consumer problem for parameterization (1.31):
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 (￿i;si) Y = !i
n (fsig)Y
;
where ￿C2 and ￿Y are the multipliers to the aggregation constraints. Substituting the



















￿ (fsig)￿ (Y );
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Likewise, for a given distribution of abilities f￿igi2I, current policy (C1;S;A1) and fore-


































































where ￿C1, ￿S and ￿A are the multipliers to the aggregation constraints. By the envelope
theorem applied to the individual problem, V 2;i
si = ￿n (ni)ni
 s(￿i;si)





￿￿ (1 + r):
Then, using the solution to the second period decentralization derived above:
’
1





























































substituting si in !i
y (fsig); we conclude that !i
y = !i
s in equilibrium. The expression for a1
i
is unnecessary to solve the social problem when there is government commitment. For the
time-consistent solution, it may be derived from the implementability condition uc (c1
i) =
￿ (1 + r)uc (e c2
i) , c1
i = e c2
i; making use of (1.18) and the individual budget constraints in
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(1.3) as expected by the agents. This de￿nes a1
i as a function of e ￿y, current policy (C1;S;T 1)
and individual characteristics: a1
i, ￿i: We may ￿nally replace the equilibrium values in the
































u = e ￿2;m
u :￿
Proof of Proposition 1.3:













































is equal to ￿2;m
￿ (fsig) after the fsigi2I are
appropriately substituted for. Using the solution to the ￿ctitious representative consumer,



























































y (fsig) after the fsigi2I are substituted.
Taking derivatives of U1;m with respect to C1 and S; of U2;m w.r.t. C2 and Y and of
W (￿) w.r.t all its arguments and replacing in (1.25), we obtain the expressions in Proposition
2 and the zero tax on savings.￿
Proof of Proposition 1.3:
The steps to derive the time consistent tax and education subsidy are similar to those
taken to derive Proposition 1.3. A major di⁄erence is that the second period government
chooses f’2
ig without replacing fsigi2I by their equilibrium expressions (which do depend
on the weights at time 2, as shown above). Indeed, W2 (￿) becomes, after replacing c2
i and
yi by !2;i
c C2 and !i





























C2 (1 + r);
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with ￿2;W














i￿i no longer drops
out of the Lagrangian and a⁄ects the social marginal utility of aggregate consumption at
time 2. Using (1.28) and the expression derived before for U2;m, we arrive at the optimal b ￿y
in Proposition 1.4.
Shifting to the ￿rst period, note ￿rst that the ￿rst order condition for (si)8i in the ￿cti-
tious representative consumer problem may be used to derive U
1;m








which is the same we obtain under commitment except that e Y and e ’
2
i replace Y and ’2
i:
Also, a1
i is derived from the individual Euler equation (1.5) with zero marginal taxes; i.e.,
c1
i = e c2
i: For given private expectations on future policy under time-consistency, the ￿rst
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sC1 ￿ e T 2 + e !
i
ye Y (1 ￿ e ￿y)
2 + r
:







































C2 (1 + r);
with W
2
standing for W 2 (￿) after incorporating fsigi2I as functions of S. The full derivatives
of W1 (￿) may thus be computed after replacing the individual allocations as dependent





C2 = 1 + r as in the commitment case, thatW1
C1=W1
A = 1 in the social optimum
and that W1
A = ￿e V
2;soc
A = ￿ (1 + r)f W 2
C2; we get e ￿ = 1 in formula (1.30). Thus, (1 ￿ b x) =









, which renders the expression for b x in Proposition 1.4 upon substituting
the relevant derivatives and noting that the implementability condition c1
i = e c2
i implies
C1 = e C2.￿
Optimal Tax / Subsidy Rates in Detail:
Following Atkeson, Chari, Kehoe (1999), we may develop the expressions in (1.25), (1.26),
(1.28) and (1.30) further by writing the social marginal rates of substitution as: for the
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If all agents are equal to the representative consumer, these expressions have an exact
parallel with those derived by Atkeson, Chari and Kehoe (1999), Therein, the "H" terms
are interpreted as general equilibrium elasticities, which is what planner cares about. In the












































































































i￿i = 0; i.e, (1.29) does not depend on T1:
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The social marginal rate of substitution between aggregate consumption and leisure
in period 2 di⁄ers from the commitment to the no commitment case because the general
equilibrium elasticities change. That is both due to a neglect of past incentives by the un-






i (1 + r)￿i term. The committed government disregards
the latter because it faces an intertemporal implementability constraint and is free to set
any intertemporal price.




S is distinct from that of
WY
WS to the extent that i) Y is set
by the second period government not in the same way as the ￿rst period government would
prefer, which in turn impacts the relative preference for higher schooling; ii) S - and through
it also faigi2I - become state variables in the second period - S does not a⁄ect future policy
rules but is does determine the scope for high second period (and, hence, lifetime) welfare.
Finally, iii) policy makers cannot optimize over ￿0
a. Hence it is relevant how far S a⁄ects





i (1 + r)￿i term.
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TIME-CONSISTENT REDISTRIBUTION POLICY AND
EDUCATION SUBSIDIES UNDER ALTERNATIVE FISCAL
CONSTITUTIONS
2.1 Introduction
Classical theories of optimal ￿scal policy often assume that the planner is restricted to
the use of distortionary taxes to ￿nance public expenditures. In this framework, the seminal
contribution of Fischer (1980) has shown that second best allocations are not implementable
if governments lack commitment, as it is always optimal to revise plans after investment
decisions are made. If governments may resort to lump sum taxation, however, there is
no time-inconsistency problem whatsoever and the ￿rst best might always be implemented.
Mirrless (1971) builds up the case for distortionary taxation when governments care for equity
but cannot observe all relevant individual characteristics. If agents di⁄er in the ability to
pay taxes with the same e⁄ort, such governments would like to use ability-contingent tax
bills and fully redistribute luck. That is generally not incentive feasible if abilities are not
observable; but by using distortionary taxation the government may explore di⁄erences in
relative preferences for e⁄ort and provide partial insurance. Naturally, any information on
the individual that is correlated with its ability will optimally be used by the policy maker.
Like in the classical optimal taxation theory, the objective of the government is always to
provide public goods - including redistribution - in the least distortionary way.
The central friction in the Mirrless framework is that the source of inequality is exogenous
and unobservable. Arguably, though, labor productivity is not simply determined by luck
but is (also) the product of voluntary investment in human capital carried out in the early
stages of the life cycle. When governments have that into account, the optimal redistributive
allocation is best implemented not only through income taxation but also with the use of
education policy, so long as (at least part of) education investment is measurable by the
￿scal authority. Bovenberg and Jacobs (2005), Reis (2005) and Maldonado (2007) have
shown that to be the case in static settings with endogenous labor productivity. In general,
distortionary subsidies to education should be used to o⁄set indirect distortions caused by
the taxation of labor supply.
34
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There has been a recent revival of Mirrless￿ s theory of optimal taxation as economists seek
to extend its basic insights into dynamic problems. Important contributions in this literature
include Golosov, Kocherlakota and Tsyvinski (2003), Kocherlakota (2005), Albanesi and
Sleet (2005) and Werning (2007)1. Bohacek and Kapicka (2008) consider again the case
where skills are built up endogenously as the product of initial ability and time dedicated to
human capital accumulation. Education policy plays a small role in their setup only because
its costs are implicitly deductible in the tax bill already.
Importantly, as we frame the redistribution problem into a dynamic setting the time-
inconsistency problem of second best policies reemerges. To see it, suppose agents types are
permanent. After a ￿rst period has passed in which the government screens agents through
the tax system, informational asymmetries are gone and the government may implement a
￿rst best redistribution policy. For the particular case of endogenous labor productivity, dif-
ferences in early investment in education incentivated by an appropriate government subsidy
schedule would allow perfect identi￿cation of individuals as they enter in the labor market.
Income could, thus, be fully redistributed, which in this extreme case completely eliminates
incentives for the most able individuals to study more a priori.
In practice, the disincentive will be as strong as tighter the relation between future
income taxes and the worker educational status [presuming there is a correlation between
investment and attainment] and that is bound to in￿ uence decisively the optimal design of
education policy. With that in mind, in this paper we use a two-period, two-class economy
with endogenous skills borrowed from Chapter 1 to compare optimal non-linear redistrib-
ution policy under two kinds of ￿scal constitution: one in which the income tax schedule
may depend on all observable individual variables, including past schooling; and another in
which taxes may depend on the gross income of the individuals only, i.e., there is limited
record keeping. Hence, we take in the latter a looser interpretation of the Mirrless (1971)
informational frictions: even if governments could measure individual productivity, they are
not allowed to condition income taxes on that information. Such is the property of the in-
come taxes codes in virtually all real economies, which constitutes the main motivation for
undergoing our proposed analysis.
We ￿nd that constraining the income tax function to depend only on earned income
enhances social welfare when education cannot be subsidized at more than 100% of its cost.
Intuitively, under full record second period governments always choose to fully redistribute
labor income if they can condition income taxes on agents￿productivities, for which past
education is a perfect proxy in our model. Thus, returns on schooling are expropriated and
1See also Golosov, Tsyvinsky and Werning (2007) for a comprehensive survey.
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individuals are actually worse o⁄for becoming more productive since they are forced later to
work more. When taxes depend exclusively on gross income, incentives for labor supply are
provided by allocating higher net income to the most productive individuals. Education has
then a strictly positive marginal value for private agents. In equilibrium, aggregate resources
increase su¢ ciently that, despite the absence of full redistribution, average utility is higher.
The case for limited record keeping is less clear if governments can e⁄ectively pay agents
to study. But even in that case, the bene￿ts from having perfect redistribution of resources
during adulthood do not necessarily compensate the lifetime costs of necessary education
distortions in the ￿rst period. That depends on how close we would be to perfect redistri-
bution under limited record, which in turn relies on the parameters of the model. Anyway,
we learn with our analysis that the implications for optimal education policy of one or the
other ￿scal constitutions are rather di⁄erent. If only informational frictions bind and policy
is chosen sequentially, there is a case of massive subsidization of non-compulsory education,
even in the absence of any externality motive. By contrast, if the tax bill may depend solely
on gross income, agents are optimally called to support part of their marginal education
costs; in our stylized model more so for lower levels of education.
Time-inconsistency e⁄ects in non-linear redistribution policy with endogenous produc-
tivities have previously been discussed by Boadway et al. (1996). The authors consider an
economy where governments may always observe ￿nal productivities, regardless of the com-
mitment technology, but not education investment. Mandatory education is then shown to
be welfare improving, a result that our solution for time-consistent policy under full record
keeping generalizes. In a follow up paper, Konrad (2001) argues that, indeed, letting gov-
ernments collect information on agents ￿nal productivity after schooling choices are made
always hampers social welfare. Like in Boadway et al. (1996), the mechanism through which
the government would acquire such information is not endogenous. Individuals are ex ante
equal in his model, meaning that they choose equal amounts of schooling, if any. Our model
is, thus, more general than these two previous analysis. We consider individuals who are
di⁄erently able a priori and whose schooling choices are the source of full information in the
second period. We also distinguish the inconsistency problem associated with information
screening from that arising, a la Fischer (1980), with the intertemporal investment in hu-
man capital: skills are endogenous ex-ante, but inelastic ex-post. Finally, we allow for more
general education policies in the intertemporal policy mix.
Our paper also relates to a recent body of literature on time-consistent redistribution.
This literature is pioneered by Roberts (1984) who studies optimal income taxation with
discrete types in in￿nite horizon, concluding that the only possible equilibrium is the pooling
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of types by the ￿scal authority. Berliant and Ledyard (2005) consider optimal nonlinear
taxation in a two period economy with a continuum of types and permanent skills. Brett
and Weymark (2008) also focuses on a two-period deterministic setting, but takes only two
individuals and analyses the time-consistent redistribution problem when agents are allowed
to save. A similar kind of problem is discussed by Bisin and Rampini (2006), who with a
series of simple two-period, two-types examples show that granting private agents access to
anonymous capital markets may improve social welfare. The argument for implementing
limited record keeping in our paper is particularly related to their proposal.
By looking at a single life-cycle, we exclude all kinds of reputation mechanisms. In the
context of the new dynamic public ￿nance literature, Acemoglu et al. (2008) and Fahri and
Werning (2008) have looked at the redistribution policies that such mechanisms can sustain
in in￿nite horizon, also having into account political frictions. As expected, disincentives
for truth-telling and investment are considerably lessened in that case, even if taxes may be
history-dependent.
The paper is organized as follows. Section 2.2 sets up the economy, the individuals￿
problem and the equilibrium under laissez faire. In Section 2.3 we describe the ￿rst best
allocation as a benchmark and in Section 2.4 the second best outcome. We argue in this
section that limited record keeping is harmful when governments have commitment but works
as a powerful commitment device otherwise, given the inconsistency problem inherent to the
second best plan. The time-consistent policy mix is scrutinized in Section 2.5, emphasizing
the contrast between the full and limited record solutions. Section 2.6 concludes the paper
and Section 2.7 gathers the proofs.
2.2 The Economy
We consider a simple deterministic economy that lasts 2 periods: youth (y) and
adulthood (o). There is a continuum of agents, divided into two types, i = 1;2, which have
equal weight in the population [the measure of the population is normalized to 2]. Types
are de￿ned by a di⁄erent ability to pro￿t from schooling, which we assume to be higher for
type 1 than for type 2. Each agent of type i starts youth with cognitive ability ￿i (￿1 > ￿2)
and has then to decide how much to invest in education out of a net initial budget that
we de￿ne bellow. The relative price of schooling is normalized to 1, so that si units of
forgone consumption yield a future hourly wage equal to   (￿i;si) =  i; with   (￿) a C2
function, strictly increasing and concave in both arguments and such that   (￿i;0) =   and
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lims!0  s = +1.2 One may interpret the parameter ￿ as the joint product of innate ability,
parents￿early investment and nurture during childhood. We therefore assume that there is
complementarity between schooling and cognitive ability:  s￿ > 0:
During adulthood, agents earn gross labor income Yi =  ini, where ni is the number








i) + ￿ [u(c
o
i) ￿ ￿ (ni)]; (2.1)
with 0 < ￿ < 1; u0;￿0;￿00 > 0 and u00 < 0:
Individuals are endowed in the ￿rst period with a non-negative amount of resources k0=2,
which, without loss of generality, we assume to be equal across types. Importantly, they do
not have access to capital markets. Although restrictive, this assumption notably simpli￿es
the analysis and, for a reasonable parameterization of  (￿), is equivalent to the usual premise
that young agents cannot borrow against their future earnings in the private market. We
comment further on the practical motivation for this restriction in footnotes 7 and 19.
The government in this economy simply designs a redistributive tax/subsidy system,
having no net revenue requirements. Unlike young households, it may borrow/save in in-
ternational capital markets at gross rate 1 + r. Hence, it is partially able to alleviate the
borrowing constants faced in the private sector. Policy makers cannot generally to identify
agents by their types, as ￿i;  i and ni are not directly observable, but know agents￿prefer-
ences and the human capital technology and may observe total income, schooling choices and
consumption levels. Fiscal policy is thus an intertemporal subsidy/tax schedule fSi;Tigi=1;2
which may depend on observable variables only.3 That said, we will consider in this paper
di⁄erent scenarios corresponding to di⁄erent ￿scal constitutions. These amount to distinct
set of rules on the particular form that fSi;Tigi=1;2 may take.




i + si ￿ k0=2 + Si; (2.2a)
c
o
i ￿ Yi ￿ Ti; i = 1;2: (2.2b)
Agent i￿ s optimization problem is therefore that of maximizing (2.1) subject to these budget
constraints and a time constraint ni ￿ n, taking as given the redistribution policy4 and the
2The last condition is su¢ cient for an interior choice of si; i=1;2 in most equilibria considered in this
paper, but it is not necessary.
3Taxes will not depend on consumption levels directly because those are completely determined by income,
the tax bill and the education expenditure.
4Whilst in scenarios where the government may credibly commit to future policy Ti is exactly known
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choices of all other agents. Instead, the government maximizes an utilitarian social welfare
function subject to aggregate feasibility, information problems, commitment technology and
the ￿scal constitution.
It is shown in the appendix that the solution to the household￿ s programme, when




















= 1 ￿ TY (si;Yi): (2.4)
These are not a⁄ected by the timing of actions, as there is no uncertainty in the model
and the households￿choices are not subject to a time inconsistency problem. Equation (2.4)
is standard; it simply equates the marginal rate of substitution of leisure for consumption
in the second period to the net wage rate of e⁄ective labor supply [the gross wage rate of
e⁄ective labor supply - ni i - is equal to 1]. (2.3), instead, states that the marginal rate of
substitution of schooling for consumption in the ￿rst period, which for a given labor supply
is decreasing in si, is higher if subsidies to education are low and/or if returns to education













suggesting that ceteris paribus investment in education is discouraged by high income taxa-
tion.
We close this section with a description of a useful benchmark:
The laissez faire equilibrium
In laissez faire all taxes and marginal taxes are set to zero. In this case, both margins
come undistorted, and so does the intertemporal margin ￿u0(co
i)=u0(c
y
i): In particular, we
have




implying that the relation between cognitive ability and education is not necessarily monotonic,
even in laissez faire. Applying the implicit function theorem to the individual problem, it is
at the begining of lifetime, whenever policy is chosen sequentially agents must form expectations on the
future tax schedule. It is an equilibrium requirement that such expectations are correct. Nonetheless, we
are abusing notation by writing Ti irrespectively of the timing assumption of government choice. We do it
as it comes at no interpretation cost.
5As is well know, in optimal non-linear taxation models with a ￿nite number of types, the solution for
the tax schedule is usually a non-di⁄erentiable (step) funtion. Ss;Ts and TY in equations (2.3) and (2.4)
shall be interpreted as implicit marginal tax rates at the equilibrium and not as actual derivatives.
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possible to show that for a su¢ ciently low elasticity of substitution between schooling and
ability in the human capital technology and an intertemporal elasticity of substitution close
to 1, we obtain s1 > s2 in the optimum [see also Boadway, Marceau and Machand (1996)
for a environment with inelastic labor supply]. In e⁄ect, such seems to be the relevant case
in real economies, but it is not a necessary prediction of our setup.
Non participation in capital markets implies that agents do not equally smooth con-
sumption intertemporally.
2.3 Redistribution Policy with Complete Information
Suppose the government can recognize types, in the sense that it observes individual
￿
0s and may choose any fSi;Tigi=1;2 measurable on ￿i. We follow the leading case in the





























with U (￿) as de￿ned in (2.1) and therefore W o (co
1;co
2;n1;n2) representing the social contin-
uation value after the ￿rst period. The problem of the policy maker can be stated as one of
choosing directly allocations fc
y
i;si;co
i;Yigi=1;2 subject to a feasibility constraint instead of































Yi =   (￿i;si)ni; ni ￿ n; i = 1;2; (2.7b)
k0 and ￿1;￿2 are given. (2.7c)
We characterize its unique solution in Proposition 1.
Proposition 1: At the ￿rst best allocation of the economy described in Section 2, (i) con-






2, (ii) there is perfect consumption
smoothing - u0 (c
y
i)=u0 (co
i) = ￿ (1 + r), 8i and (iii) schooling investment and labor supply
are higher for the most able individual - s1 > s2 and n1 > n2. Therefore, type-1 agents are
strictly worse-o⁄ than type-2 agents.
Proof: See appendix.
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Like in laissez faire, all marginal rates of substitution ￿ and in this case also the in-
tertemporal margin￿ are equal to 1. Thus, marginal taxes/subsidies must be null: Ss =
Ts = TY = 0. Implementing the optimal allocation through a tax system is otherwise
straightforward, since agents are exactly identi￿able. The ￿scal authority will just need to
impose a prohibitive tax on choices other than the social optimum. Because there are no
revenue requirements, we have that S1 + (1 + r)
￿1 T1 = ￿
￿




Noteworthy, the intertemporal composition of individual tax bills is indeterminate; only
its present value matters. This is because in a ￿rst best equilibrium the absence of informa-
tional problems at the beginning of each period and the fact that the social planner does not
need to resort to distortionary taxation put o⁄ time inconsistency problems. The solution
to the problem is the same weather decisions are all taken at date zero or sequentially in
the life cycle. It also does not depend on the ￿scal authority keeping record of ￿rst period
allocations, as the second period government is anyway fully informed of agents￿types.
2.4 Optimal Nonlinear Redistribution Policy under Commitment
It follows from Proposition 1 that when the ￿scal authority cannot observe ￿ the ￿rst
best allocation is not incentive compatible. Agents born with high cognitive ability would,
if they can, claim to be less talented and see their utility thereby increase. Therefore, we
characterize in this section the mechanism design problem faced by the social planner under
asymmetric information. Similar policy problems have been studied by Boverberg and Jacobs
(2005, 2008), Reis (2005) and Bohacek and Kapicka (2008) for continuum of types, and
Maldonado (2007) in a two-class economy. Since for now we keep the credibility assumption,
a Revelation Principle allows us to focus on direct truth-telling mechanisms through which




















i) + ￿ [u(c
o











; i;j = 1;2; i 6= j
and conditions (2:7a); (2:7b); (2:7c):
Unlike in a two-class economy with an utilitarian social welfare function and separable
utility, one cannot guarantee that only the incentive compatibility constraint of the highest
type binds, unless we assume that n1 ￿ n2 and s1 ￿ s2 in the optimum [su¢ cient but
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not necessary]. For illustrative purposes we will characterize these type of equilibria only
throughout the various sections of the paper￿ the "normal" case, in the terminology of
Stiglitz (1982) and a standard practice in the literature￿ , calling the attention of the reader
whenever that option is consequential.
The solution to this pure second best policy problem is derived in the appendix and has
similar properties to those found in the related literature:
Proposition 2: At a second best allocation of the economy described in Section 2, (i)






2, (ii) there is perfect consump-
tion smoothing - u0 (c
y
i)=u0 (co




1=1, (iv) labor supply of the low types is distorted downwards: 0 < -
MRSY2;co
2 < 1 and (v) net distortion on human capital investment depends on  (￿): 0 <
MRSs2;c
y
2 is <, = or > than -MRSY2;co
2 whenever  s=  is increasing, constant or decreasing
in ￿; respectively.
Apart from (i) and (iii), this is a general result, not con￿ned to the "normal" case. The
two conditions, as well as condition (iv), follow from the assumption that the most able
individuals, and only those, bene￿t from an informational advantage in equilibrium. It is
interesting to interpret (ii) and (v) at the light of such informational advantage.6 Whereas
the policy maker can extract information on who is who due to an heterogeneous distaste
for e⁄ective labor supply Yi =  ini which induces agents to settle on a di⁄erent marginal
rate of substitution of consumption for leisure, intertemporal preferences for consumption
are common due to separability. The rate at which they would optimally trade consump-
tion intertemporally, had they the opportunity to do so, is exactly the same. Thus, the
policy maker does not have any reason to give away this feature of the ￿rst best alloca-
tion. Clearly, investment in human capital is an indirect way of smoothing consumption
across periods which individual agents can directly use, but in this case the government




2), which it doesn￿ t do in ￿rst best. Schooling expenditure may
be understood as part of a lifetime labor supply; it reduces youth felicity through a drop
in consumption but enhances productivity per hour or, equivalently, consumption per unit
of foregone leisure in the future. If  s=  is not constant in ￿ [elasticity of substitution in
the human capital technology di⁄erent from 1], the preference for more education holding
all the other margins ￿xed is di⁄erent, like the distaste for the observable Yi is. Distorting
this margin constitutes an additional mechanism of dealing with the information asymmetry
between private individuals and the government. Namely, if s and ￿ are strong complements,
6For a deeper discussion of result (v) in a static environment see Bovenberg and Jacobs (2008).
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s2 is distorted downwards because type 1 likes schooling relatively more.7
As is well known, the decentralization of the second best equilibrium through a system of
taxes and subsidies does not take a unique form. The allocations may be implemented with
any ￿scal plan that observes the implicit marginal taxes derived in the appendix and the
feasibility constraints. In particular, the government may choose to set Ts(i) = 0, i = 1;2
and Ss(i) = 1 ￿ MRSsi;c
y
i [or vice versa]: In that case, Proposition 2 implies 0 ￿ Ss(i) < 1,
unless education is a very strong substitute for cognitive ability in the accumulation of
human capital8. When  s=  is constant in ￿; marginal subsidies to education exactly match
marginal income taxes. From (2.5), that corresponds to undistorted education investment,
or a zero human capital wedge.
Second best equilibrium in the absence of education policy
Suppose governments may commit at date zero to a future income taxation policy but
cannot set education subsidies/taxes ￿ i.e., fsigi=1;2 are not observable, meaning that in
practice neither these nor consumption allocations are contractible by the ￿scal authority.
They would face a similar programme to (2.8), except that the incentive compatibility con-






















  (￿i;b si)
￿￿
; i;j = 1;2
involving an extra agency problem [notice that we do not require i 6= j] because agents
may freely deviate from both planner￿ s recommendations (c
y
i;si)i=1;2. That is, investment in
education is any individually a⁄ordable amount that follows equation (2.5) with Ss (si) =
Ts (si;Yi) = 0. In equilibria such that  1 ￿  2 it still holds that TY(1) = 0 and TY(2) 2
[0;1) 9, and vice versa. Given our assumptions on the skill technology, this means that all
agents still pick a strictly positive level of schooling, even if the implicit marginal cost is now
higher for the less productive agent.
By construction, the income tax schedule initially chosen by the planner cannot depend
on schooling in this case. We now turn to the discussion of equilibria with that same property
but where governments are otherwise free to choose any education policy.
7It would be straightforward to allow for individual borrowing/saving in the second best. Apart from an
additional non-arbitrage condition, the equilibrium properties would not be a⁄ected. As Brett and Weymark
(2008) show in a related paper, the planner would not distort individual savings decisions precisely because
agents have common intertemporal preferences for consumption.
8Empirical studies, e.g. after Carneiro and Heckman (2003), suggest a strong complementarity between
cognitive ability built up during childhood and posterior investment on education.
9See proof of Proposition 1.
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2.4.1 Nonlinear Policy with Limited Record Keeping: T (s;Y ) = T (Y )
The inability of policy makers to condition tax plans on particular individual variables
￿ be it innate characteristics such as ￿ in our model or choices like labor supply, schooling
or consumption￿ is typically interpreted in the optimal non-linear taxation literature as the
consequence of an information friction. In this section, we take the alternative view that the
shape of a tax plan is surely conditioned by what the government can measure, but also by
the ￿scal constitution, i.e., a set of rules [tacit or explicit, in real economies] that dictate the
variables upon which taxes can be made contingent. Naturally, this pulls us away from a
pure Mirrleesian exercise. Nonetheless, policy makers are often de facto restricted on what
they can tax/subsidize besides what they can e⁄ectively measure. It is appealing to ask
what is the best tax schedule that observes such additional restrictions and to what extent
social welfare is hampered [or not] by them.
In this paper, we are particularly interested in characterizing optimal redistribution
policy when income taxation may not condition on past schooling choices10: T (s;Y ) =
T (Y ). Such form of limited record keeping has not been studied in the literature11, despite
its empirical relevance. As regards of the planner￿ s problem stated in terms of quantities, it
implies that equilibrium allocations must depend on reports of the respective period only.
Therefore, in our economy the planner will have to elicit the true type of each agent twice.
In practice, the optimization programme is that of the second best policy (2.8) with two
kinds of extra agency constraints. First, given ￿rst period truthful revelation, agents must
have an incentive to keep on reporting their true type. I.e.,
u(c
o







; i;j = 1;2; i 6= j: (2.9)
Second, they must be deterred from mis-reporting in the ￿st period only:
u(c
y







; i;j = 1;2; i 6= j: (2.10)
Importantly, even though agents are asked to reveal their types at di⁄erent points in time,
the tax authority commits at date zero to the announced ￿scal plan. For parameterizations
of the economy such that we fall in a "normal" case, we show in the appendix to Proposition
3 that this planner faces only two binding constraints: (2.9) for i = 1 and (2.10) for i = 2:
Proposition 3: The limited record plan of a committed government implies, (i) consumption
higher for type 1 during adulthood - co
1 > co





10Kapicka (2006) and Gaube (2007) look at optimal non-linear taxation in economies where there is limited
record of past incomes.
11Certainly, limited record is an implicit assumption of all linear taxation models - see e.g. Pereira (2008).
The extra degree of freedom we are allowing for is the shape of the tax function.
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consumption smoothing - u0 (c
y
2)=u0 (co
2) < ￿ (1 + r) < u0 (c
y
1)=u0 (co
1), (iii) no distortion of
labor supply at the top: MRSY1;co
1=1, but (iv) MRSs1;c
y
1 < 1, if
@( s= )
@￿ ￿ 0 [indeterminate
otherwise], (v) labor supply of the low types distorted downwards: MRSY2;co





Equilibrium properties are signi￿cantly di⁄erent from those in Proposition 2, hinting
a lower achieved social welfare. Namely, new intertemporal distortions arise. Perfect con-
sumption smoothing no longer holds, not because agents now have di⁄erent intertemporal
preferences over consumption but because informational advantages are not constant over
time. In particular, in equilibria with  1 >  2 it is the group of highly able individuals that
enjoys an informational advantage in the second period; but, for the same cy, low ability
individuals always bene￿t from higher levels of education - namely s1 - if they are then free
to report being of low type - work to generate Y2 - in the second period. Naturally, low
ability individuals would not prefer studying more during youth if that required having to
produce as much as Y1 in the future [as it does in the second best]. The necessary e⁄ort for
that would not compensate mis-reporting during youth. Likewise, high ability agents would
be less attracted by type 2s￿second period allocation if they had to also pick (c
y
2;s2).
Hence, low types have an e⁄ective informational advantage in the ￿rst period vis-a-vis




1 is necessary to elicit types in the ￿rst period, whilst co
1 > co
2
as usual. Providing redistribution entails poorer smoothing of consumption. Furthermore,
education investment is now distorted upwards for type 1 [unless
@( s= )
@￿ is really very small;
see appendix] and downwards for type 2s, who see their income taxed at the margin in the
last period. That holds even with an unitary elasticity of complementarity between ￿ and s.
The perfect match between marginal subsidies and taxes identi￿ed in Bovenberg and Jacobs
(2005) does not survive the limited record assumption because schooling and labor supply
no longer a⁄ect incentives in a symmetric fashion.
The expressions provided in the appendix also suggest that type-2￿ s labor wedge is
widened ￿ marginal taxes on income are higher￿ , although that depends on the equilibrium
values for gross income of the two types. The new e⁄ect comes from the harmful impact
that Y2 has on the ￿rst period screening problem. Having a larger marginal tax indirectly
reduces incentives to mimic type 1 during youth.
Evidence that the ex-ante representative household must be [weakly] worse o⁄ is simply
the fact that the best limited record allocation was necessarily feasible for the second best
planner - that of Proposition 2 - whilst the contrary is not true. That, of course, relies on
the assumption that ￿scal planners can commit up-front to the income tax schedule. When
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governments lack a commitment technology one cannot draw the same conclusion, as we will
make clear in Section 2.5.
We close this Section with a discussion of the commitment problem that will arise in our
intertemporal redistribution setting.
2.4.2 Time Inconsistency and the Ratchet E⁄ect
The second best equilibrium summarized in Proposition 2 su⁄ers from a credibility prob-
lem. The reason is two-fold. First, there is a Fischer(1980)-like time inconsistency issue
associated with the optimal distortions over human capital investment. Once youth has
passed and schooling choices are made, di⁄erences in skill levels are ￿xed and gross income
may be redistributed more e⁄ectively by disregarding the e⁄ects on past incentives to study
￿ i.e., part of lifetime labor supply is seen as inelastic. Second, at the beginning of adult-
hood the asymmetric information problem is already resolved because youth allocations are
type-dependent. A benevolent policy maker re-optimizing at this date would better use all
the available information and eliminate distortions, giving rise to a ratchet e⁄ect whereby
the government may extract more income taxes from the most able individuals if they reveal
their types up-front.
When the government is free to condition the tax schedule on whatever available infor-
mation, these two problems collapse indeed into a single time-inconsistency problem; that of
the ratchet e⁄ect. Recent contributions by Berliant and Leyard (2005), Bisin and Rampini
(2006), Brett and Weymark (2008) and Krause (2008) deal with the time inconsistency of
nonlinear taxation in two-period economies under such approach12. To the best of our knowl-
edge, there is not yet a study of time-consistent redistribution policy in economies where the
ratchet e⁄ect is avoided by the ￿scal constitution but that still face a commitment problem
in the nonlinear policy design. Bisin and Rampini (2006) consider the potential bene￿ts of
granting agents access anonymous markets and eliminating the ratchet e⁄ect. However, the
economies under study are such that anonymous markets also prevent any redistribution in
the second period [there will simply be no observable basis for taxation].
To see how the ratchet e⁄ect operates in our economy consider the outcome of Section
2.3. In particular, consider the optimality conditions for labor supply and consumption in the
second period. When second period governments know the identity of agents, net incomes
are equalized and the most skilled individuals enjoy relatively less leisure than in the second
best. That is, all their information rents are lost. Hence, they face a strong disincentive
12Freixas, Guesnerie and Tirole (1985) and DillØn and Lundholm (1996) analyse the ratchet e⁄ect in the
context of optimal linear taxation in two period settings.
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to reveal their type a priori, be it through a higher schooling investment or any distinctive
choice that tags them as the most skilled. In fact, when second period governments are
fully informed, the marginal value of education is negative from an individual perspective.
Because there￿ s a continuum of individuals, future consumption is taken as given, whilst
labor supply is strictly increasing in productivity.
Time inconsistency in the absence of education policy: the case for limited record keeping
The distortion over schooling is especially severe in the absence of education policy
or if the ￿scal authority for some reason cannot propose marginal subsidies to education
above 100%, which would not bind under commitment. Consider the incentives faced by
a single individual when second period governments observe schooling choices. If all other
individuals choose levels of schooling such that s1 6= s2 [i.e., there￿ s a ￿rst best in the
second period], she is always better o⁄dropping investment in education to zero, consuming
more in the ￿rst period and consuming the same and working less in the following period
[because the impact of her deviating on total resources would be negligible]. Thus, there
is no possible equilibrium with s1 6= s2: When 0 < s1 = s2 future governments remain
uninformed of types and therefore implement a traditional second best allocation for the one
last period. Nonetheless, individuals of type 2 at least would also prefer not to study at all
and being identi￿ed with the skill level   (￿;0) =  . That would actually lead to higher
consumption not only in the ￿rst but also in the second period13 and, again, to less working
hours. Naturally, because all type 2 individuals behave symmetrically, we would be back to
a s1 6= s2 situation. Thus, as long as individuals face a weakly positive marginal price of
schooling and there is full record keeping with no government commitment investment in
education is zero for all types14. Social welfare would be lower than in laissez faire as there
would be no redistribution at all in either period and both agents would be constrained in
their choice of schooling15. Being lower than in laissez faire, it is also necessarily lower than
the second best equilibrium because the former is a feasible allocation for the second best
planner.
Limited record keeping is undoubtfully bene￿cial in this case. Even in the absence of any
education policy, if governments cannot condition income taxes on previous schooling choices,
13See proof of Proposition 1 in the appendix.
14Konrad (2001) discusses a similar result in an economy where ￿nal di⁄erences in productivity are random
and not type speci￿c.
15Boadway et al (1996) characterize a similar situation with no education policy [we refer to the time-
consistency formulation of Section IV in their paper]. Their economy has a ￿nite number of agents of each
type, but again if this number is su¢ ciently large, incentives to educate are so low that no one does it.
The mechanism is slightly di⁄erent from ours because the authors assume that productivities are always
observable in the second period. There is no ratchet e⁄ect, then, but the e⁄ect of time inconsistency is still
the same.
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second period redistribution policy is set as in a one-shot two-class economy [a la Stiglitz
(1982)] where  i is ￿xed but is private information. The ratchet e⁄ect is no longer into
play as governments now commit not to explore acquired information on individual types.
Therefore 0 ￿ TY (i) < 1; inducing agents to invest a strictly positive share of their resources
in education as was the case in the full commitment equilibrium without education subsidies.
Yet, the endogeneity of schooling choices ￿ i.e., their cost in terms of youth consumption￿ is
still disregarded by the policy maker at the start of adulthood. Consequentially, the income
tax schedule is suboptimal from the ￿rst period point of view; a time-inconsistency problem
subsisting despite the abolition of the ratchet e⁄ect.
Theorem 1: In the absence of education policy, or if implicit marginal subsidies to education
are constrained to a 100% ceiling, full record keeping and lack of commitment induce an
equilibrium with no education investment and social welfare bellow that of the laissez faire.
In this scenario, limited record keeping (i) improves lifetime social welfare, but (ii) is not
su¢ cient to restore the equilibrium with perfect commitment. The lack of credibility is, thus,
still welfare detrimental.
Proof: See appendix.
As regards (i), for consumption in both periods and leisure as normal goods, the increase
in social welfare happens both ex ante and ex post education decisions. (ii) asserts the
distinction between time-inconsistency in the choice of the tax schedule and the pure ratchet
e⁄ect that we discussed above. Welfare is lower than the equilibrium described in Proposition
3, to which the only di⁄erence is the commitment assumption. By transitivity, it is also
necessarily worse than the pure second best allocation.
When schooling is observable, it is straightforward for any government to rule out a
zero schooling situation by simply imposing a su¢ ciently heavy tax on choices bellow the
minimum optimal level of s. The problem then becomes the asymmetric information on who
is the cleverest a priori. In the next section we characterize time-consistent redistribution
policy when the government is free to set any incentive scheme for education, comparing
solutions and social welfare under the full and limited record regimes.
2.5 Optimal Time-Consistent Nonlinear Redistribution Policy
In this last section we study the properties and implementation of socially optimal allo-
cations chosen sequentially in time. Our main objective is to contrast the solution under the
realistic assumption that income tax schedules are set contingent on gross earnings only ￿ in
our model, only labor earnings although what we intend to stress is the separation of T(￿)
from the education level￿ and under no ad hoc restriction other than the initial asymmetric
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information over ￿i; i = 1;2.
We start by the latter. As has been recognized in the literature, when governments
cannot credibly commit not to exploit in the future collected information on individual
types, application of the standard Revelation Principle is precluded. Disincentives to reveal
one￿ s type a priori may be so large that the ￿rst period policy maker may prefer to resort
to non-revealing [pooling] mechanisms or to mixed strategies.16 Comparison across the best
of the di⁄erent options is not clear cut as it depends on the parameters of the model. In
all, the government will balance the bene￿ts from full insurance in the second period under
separation with those accruing from lower distortions over human capital investment under
pooling.
We will focus on symmetric equilibria, in which all agents of the same type choose the
same allocations when faced with the same incentives. These are either separating or pooling
equilibria. The study of semi-pooling equilibria is beyond the scope of this paper.
2.5.1 Separation in Youth with Full Insurance in Adulthood
When the ￿rst period ￿scal plan leads the two types to choose di⁄erent (c
y
i;si)i=1;2 allo-
cations, second period governments are perfectly informed of individual ability to generate
income. The redistribution problem is thus a ￿rst best:
V














2 ￿ A(1 + r) + Y1 + Y2;
Yi =   (￿i;si)ni; ni ￿ n; i = 1;2;
  (￿1;s1);   (￿2;s2); A are given:
Since W o (￿) is strictly concave and the constraint set is convex, the problem features
a unique solution. This is an optimal allocation which is a function of the e⁄ective skill
levels ￿ themselves functions of (￿i;si)i=1;2￿ and inherited public savings/debt A. There-
fore, indirect second period welfare may be written as V o;sep (s1;s2;A); which is continuous
and di⁄erentiable in its arguments by an implicit function theorem. Note that (s1;s2) in
V o;sep (s1;s2;A) stand for the human capital investment that all individuals of each type
carry. Correspondingly, we may write the individual value function as vo (si); denoting the
continuation value after investing si in education and taking as given the choices of all other
16See Bestzer and Strausz (2001, 2003).
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agents and expectations on future tax rules. We summarize some properties of the solution
to this last period redistribution problem in Lemma 1.
Lemma 1: For each vector of state variables (  (￿1;s1);  (￿2;s2);A); the unique second
period equilibrium with separation of types satis￿es: (i) co
1 = co
2 = co; n1 > (or =)n2 iff
  (￿1;s1) > (or =)  (￿2;s2) (ii) -MRSYi;co
i = 1; i=1,2; (iii) V
o;sep
A = u0 (co)(1 + r); (iv)
V o;sep
si = u0 (co)ni s (￿i;si) > 0 and (v) vo;sep
si = ￿￿0(ni)
@ni
@ i s (￿i;si):
Conditions (i) and (ii) follow from Proposition 1 and the irrelevance of a commitment
technology in the equilibrium described therein. The policy maker is able to provide full
redistribution with no e¢ ciency loss. In practice, this means that taxes are non-distortionary
and type speci￿c. In other words, ￿scal policy in this period is a tax rule fT (si;Yi)gi=1;2
such that TY(i) = 0;8i:
Parts (iii) and (iv) are obtained with an envelope theorem. The impact on social contin-
uation value of an extra unit of schooling for all individuals of each type [V o;sep
si ] is naturally
positive. It is higher for the types with higher labor supply and/or marginal return on
schooling in terms of labor productivity. Contrarily, for the individual agent studying has
negative value when it implies working more in the future. (v) was already derived in the
proof of Theorem 1 and identi￿es schooling as a "bad" for individuals when productivity is
observable in the second period.
At the start of the life-cycle both the agents and the government are aware of the
incentives of the future government. Lemma 1 is common knowledge. What is more, in
Proposition 1 we asserted the willingness of the youth policy maker to induce agents to
invest a positive share of their resources in education. Indeed, that is always feasible as we





s1 > s2 is not incentive compatible. Type 1 individuals have to be provided with incentives
to reveal their types in the ￿rst period, given that they will be certainly worse o⁄ in the
second period [in particular, worse o⁄ than by claiming to be of type 2]. That amounts to






















Two important comments are in order. First, (2.12) is the relevant incentive constraint
for truth telling insofar as agents disregard the e⁄ect of their mimicking on future aggregate
resources and distribution of types. This is why co; Y1 and Y2; as chosen by the future
government, are simply taken as given in its expression. Second, in equilibrium co; Y1
and Y2 come out of the well behaved maximization problem (2.11) as continuous functions
of the endogenous state variables (s1;s2;A). When choosing these values in the present
Pereira, Joana (2009), Essays on Time-Consistent Fiscal Policy 
European University Institute
 
DOI: 10.2870/105672.5. OPTIMAL TIME-CONSISTENT NONLINEAR REDISTRIBUTION POLICY 51
[and note that we refer now to s1 and s2 as the "schooling policy" and not the particular
investment on schooling by an agent], it is not indi⁄erent for the policy maker the extend to
which agents condition their expectations of co; Y1 and Y2 on (s1;s2;A): Put di⁄erently, the
intra-period timing of actions is consequential. If the government announces a tax schedule
￿ or, equivalently, the triple (s1;s2;A) to be implemented ￿ at date zero and commits to
it within all the youth period, expectations of future allocation values depend on what has
been announced. That would have to be considered in (2.12). But if the government has
no "intra-period commitment", individual [rational] expectations over co; Y1 and Y2 depend
only on initial state variables [distribution of cognitive abilities and initial resources] and
not on current policy.17 Then, (2.12) shall be included in the ￿rst period social programme
exactly as we have written it above. Alternatively, we may interpret that individuals are
future tax schedule takers in the ￿rst period instead of future tax rule takers in this economy.
Their forecasts on the credible future policy is then seen by the government as independent
of ￿rst period policy.
Due to the convexity of ￿ (￿) and properties of the skill technology, in all equilibria where
it is still optimal to induce s1 > s2 (2.12) is the only binding incentive constraint. In that
















2 + s1 + s2 + A ￿ k0;
conditions (2:12) and (2:7c);
V
o;sep (s1;s2;A) as de￿ned in (2:11):
The government chooses the future endogenous state variables having into account how
they a⁄ect future indirect social welfare, as expressed in Lemma 1. Optimality conditions
di⁄er from what we obtained in Section 3 as long as the respective variable relaxes or tightens
the ￿rst period agency problem. That is particularly the case with (c
y
2;s2), which size relative
to (c
y
1;s1) determines how attractive it is for type 1 agents to misrepresent their type.
Proposition 4: At a separating time-consistent equilibrium with s1 > s2











1 = 1 and (iv) MRSs2;c
y
2 < 1 if
17Cohen and Michel (1988) were the ￿rst to point out this di⁄erence within the literature of time-consistent
￿scal policy. See Ortigueira (2006) for a detailed study of intra-period timing assumption in the Markov-
perfect taxation of capital.





still necessary in all separating equilibria. The ￿nal solution is such that the main insights on how this
equilibrium compares to both the pooling solution of Section 5.2 and limited record in Section 5.3. are not
particularly a⁄ected. Thus, we leave out the full characterization of this case.
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@( s= )









By (2:12) and Lemma 1, highly able individuals will invest more in human capital only if
their consumption during youth is also higher. Since the incentive problem is irrelevant in the
second period, perfect consumption smoothing is impossible if types are to be separated in
the ￿rst period. As in the second best equilibrium, the policy maker screens agents through
the di⁄erences in their relative preferences for schooling. There is no distortion at the top,
but individuals of type 1 have a stronger taste for schooling at type-2￿ s allocation than have
agents of type 2. When the skill technology is weakly separable ￿
@( s= )
@￿ = 0￿ , it is then
optimal to introduce a positive marginal subsidy to education at the equilibrium s2 level.
As in the second best, the case for a marginal subsidy is stronger if education and ability
are weak complements. If, on the contrary, the elasticity of complementarity in the skill
technology is higher than 1 ￿ i.e.,
@( s= )
@￿ > 0￿ the optimal subsidy is reduced and it may
even turn optimal to tax education for agent 2.
Implementation
We now discuss the implementation of the time-consistent separating equilibriumthrough
a system of government prices. From part (v) of Lemma 1 and the discussion in Section 2.4.2.
we know that all agents resort to zero education if they have to support part of the investment
costs. One may reinterpret this in terms of the implicit ￿scal distortion. Redistribution with
full e¢ ciency is obtained during adulthood because the tax schedule is history dependent.
Namely, the income tax schedule does not vary with Yi but with si: Ti = T (￿i;si); s.t.
T1 + T2 = ￿A(1 + r) and T1 > (or =)T2 i⁄  1 > (or =) 2: It is straightforward to show
that T (￿i;si) is increasing in the individual si. The reason is twofold: all returns from
schooling are expropriated because consumption is equalized ex post and the future policy
maker will force the agent to work more with the rise of her individual productivity. There
is no counteracting income e⁄ect because the weight of her income in total resources is
negligible. Di⁄erentiating the individual budget constraint (2.2b) with respect to si at the




￿ ￿ ￿ ￿
co
  (￿i;si) + ni s (￿i;si);
where co is the expected future per capita consumption, which the individual takes as given.
It is shown in the appendix to Theorem 1 that this derivative, at the eyes of the individual
agent, depends only on co and  i. Denote it ns (co; i): Replacing Ts (si;Yi) by the expression
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above and TY (si;Yi) by 0 in (2.5) we get that an interior choice of schooling si may only be
implemented if marginal subsidies to education observe






Therefore, at the optimal allocation the government has to be subsidizing agents at the
margin in more than 100% to achieve its preferred "schooling policy" (s1;s2). Agents have
to be compensated for the whole cost of additional studying plus the discounted value of the
extra taxes they end up paying as adults for having studied more in the present. This may
be interpreted either as an actual payment of the education activity or as a potential loss in
transfers if education investments fall bellow the social optimum.
From Proposition 4 we know that there is no marginal subsidy at the top. There is a
positive one at the bottom as long as the elasticity of complementarity between education
and ability is low enough [although it still can be higher than 1]. In that case, the lifetime
social optimal allocation under separation, full record keeping and lack of commitment may
be implemented with the subsidy schedule:
S (s) =
(
￿low (s), if s ￿ s2
￿high (s), otherwise
;
with ￿low (s) and ￿high (s) such that:
￿
low




2 + s2 ￿ s)
, if s ￿ s2 and ￿
low
s (s) = 0 otherwise,
￿
high




1 + s1 ￿ s)
, if s ￿ s1 and ￿
high





2;s1;s2 are the solutions to (2.13). With this schedule the government again forces
agents to choose the optimal allocation. Both the present and future costs of investing in
education are just exactly covered so that agents are indi⁄erent between investing one more
unit in education or not. Noteworthy, the incentive has to be provided in the ￿rst period, as
in the second period governments would simply renege on any promised transfer conditional
on past education.
2.5.2 Pooling in Youth with Second-Best in Adulthood
When governments can keep record of previous choices, the only circumstance in which
the second period government remains uninformed of individual types arises if in the ￿rst
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period consumption and education choices are common across all agents; e.g., if the govern-
ment simply mandates a minimum level of education (and we know already that no one has
an incentive to study more than that if not paid to do so). We now study the properties of
the best equilibrium with such property. For that, as we have done in the previous subsec-
tion, we start by analyzing the second period social programme with inherited endogenous
variables (s;A) :
V






























Yi =   (￿i;s)ni; ni ￿ n; i = 1;2;
  (￿1;s);   (￿2;s); A are given:
Since   (￿1;s) >   (￿1;s); 8s; only one incentive compatibility constraint binds; that
of type 1. Furthermore, knowing s and ￿1; ￿2, the government may infer the distribution
of skills at the beginning of the working life. The solution to (2.14) has thus the canonical
properties of the one-period two class economy:
Lemma 2: For each pair of endogenous state variables (s;A); at a second period equilibrium
with previous pooling of types satis￿es: (i) co
1 > co
2; (ii) there is no distortion at the top: -
MRSY1;co
1 = 1; but n2 is distorted downwards: -MRSY2;co
2 < 1; (iii) u0 (co











Parts (i) and (ii) are standard, whilst parts (iii) and (iv) follow froman envelope argument
applied to programme (2.14). Notice that for the same total consumption during the second
period, the value of savings is now lower because there is no perfect equalization of net
resources. On the other hand, a marginal increase in the investment in education ￿ in this
case, of all agents necessarily￿ has the additional bene￿t of relaxing the agency problem
during adulthood.
In the ￿rst period the government chooses (cy;s;A) having into account how the en-
dogenous state variables a⁄ect the continuation value. Since allocations are common to all
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y + 2s + A ￿ k0;
condition (2:7c);
V
o;pool (s;A) as de￿ned in (2:14):
Due to the in￿nite productivity of the ￿rst units of education and the fact that increasing
s relaxes second period incentive constraint, the government always opts for a positive s in
this equilibrium. Following our discussion from Section 2.4.2, also in this case subsidies to
education have to be such that agents are implicitly paid to study at the margin, above the
pure schooling cost. Such implementation is more direct for the pooling equilibrium as the
policy maker would just have to impose a high enough tax on schooling choices di⁄erent
from s: Note that this is, indeed, a non-revealing tax schedule.
The properties of the equilibrium are otherwise indeterminate. It is possible to show that
the marginal rate of substitution between human capital investment and youth consumption
is distorted for at least one of the agents. If n1 > n2 and  s=  is increasing in ￿, one may
also conclude that the implicit MRSs;cy is higher for the high types and necessarily bellow
1 for the low types; but nothing further.
As in the separating equilibrium, lifetime utility is higher for the most able, as they
consume the same in the ￿rst period and enjoy information rents in the second.
2.5.3 Optimal Time-Consistent Nonlinear Redistribution Policy under Lim-
ited Record Keeping
In this last subsection we determine optimal schooling and income taxation policy when
the latter cannot be history dependent by a constitutional constraint. We argue this to be a
relevant study case insofar as it is virtually the practice in all real economies: tax codes do
not rely on information the government could use about individuals￿schooling levels, even
if there is public ￿nancial support for non-compulsory education.
As above, the redistribution problem is solved backwards. By construction, the ratchet
e⁄ect is discarded and we may exclude non-revealing mechanisms.19 Despite the government
19For this end the restriction of no individual borrowing/saving is crucial. Even if income taxes cannot
depend on schooling, when savings are taxable - that is, observable - it is possible to infer agent￿ s types.
Moreover, as long as savings di⁄er across agents, the government will fully redistribute them in our model
creating an incentive to borrow in￿nitely.
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not being authorized to condition adults￿allocation on previous schooling, we continue to
assume that in equilibrium policy makers know the correct distribution of skills as of the start
of the second period. The problem it solves is a simple one-period Mirrleesian programme
with asymmetric information on the skills  1 and  2. This problem is stated in the proof
of Theorem 1. With no surprise, when  1 >  2 the equilibrium shares properties (i) to
(iii) of Lemma 2.20 There is no distortion at the top, but type 2 agents will face a positive
marginal tax rate. Highly skilled agents consume more and, as usual, derive higher utility
in equilibrium. Also, part (iv) of Lemma 2 is valid for s1; that is, higher education for the
most able relaxes the second period incentive compatibility constraint. This is not true of
s2:
In what follows we focus on equilibria comprising n1 ￿ n2; which is su¢ cient but not
necessary to ensure s1 > s2 is the preference of the youth policy maker21. Suppose ￿rst that
during youth the government was fully informed of individual cognitive abilities. It would
then choose an allocation such that both individuals would consume the same. Is this alloca-
tion incentive compatible? To answer this question, consider ￿rst that an agent considering
misrepresenting her type neglects the impact of her action on the future distribution of skills
perceived by the the policy maker. The future allocation ￿ i.e., pairs (ci;Yi)i=1;2 from which
to self-select￿ is thus expected to be the same. Only there is now the possibility of choosing
di⁄erent type reports in di⁄erent periods. That said, it is clear that type 1 agents prefer
their allocation to that of type 2 agents. With the same cy; they would just become less
productive and derive strictly less lifetime utility under any adult skill-type report. However,
low type agents would pro￿t from claiming to have cognitive ability ￿1 in the ￿rst period
and then picking the (co
2;Y2) pair as adults22. Denoting V o;lr (s1;s2;A) the indirect utility
in the second period under limited record keeping, we may de￿ne the lifetime redistribution
20It is possible to show that ￿rst period policy makers will never set s1;s2 so that  1 <  2: The proof
consists in: (i) identifying all the relevant incentive compatibility constraints [for both periods] as we do in
this section for the "normal" case and (ii) showing that there is an alternative allocation inducing  1 ￿  2
which liberates resources for consumption for the same social desutility of e⁄ort and which weakly relaxes
the agency problem.
21When n2 > n1 ￿rst period wedges have a less clear pattern that that conveyed in Proposition 5 bellow.
Nonetheless, the comparison across ￿scal constitutions is analogous.
22See proof of Proposition 3.
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When type 2￿ s incentive compatibility constraint binds type 1 agents still prefer their





in equilibria with s1 > s2; which contrasts with the time-consistent equilibrium with full
record keeping and separation of types. Still, lifetime utility is higher for the highly able
individuals than for those with lower cognitive ability.
In Proposition 5 we fully characterize the solution to (2.16).







1; (ii) U (c
y
1;co




1 = 1 whilst
MRSs1;co
1 < 1, if
@( s= )
@￿ ￿ 0, indeterminate otherwise (iv) -MRSY2;co
2 < 1 whilst MRSs2;co
2 =
1:
Proposition 3 portrayed an equilibrium with exactly the same properties. This comes
with no surprise, as the pattern of binding incentive compatibility constraints is the same.
Similarly to the commitment solution, we also have here that for a non-empty interval
of values below 1 for the elasticity of complementarity between ￿ and s in   (￿), a positive
marginal subsidy to s1 is still optimal. Likewise, perfect consumption smoothing is impossible
as it is optimal for agent 2 to dissociate reports in youth and adulthood.
The expressions for the second period wedges provided in the appendix portray the
e⁄ect of lack of commitment under limited record. This is a Fischer (1980)-like distortion
and translates into the second period government setting a more redistributive tax plan given
the inherited state variables. That is, -MRSY2;co
2 is ceteris paribus set closer to 1, the ￿rst
best value. That likely implies a lower Y2 and a tighter ￿rst period incentive compatibility
constraint, leading to an optimally lower MRSs1;co
1 [higher marginal subsidy].
Ideally, one would like to reach an unambiguous conclusion as to the (un)desirability
of limited record when governments choose sequentially but education policy may take any
form; as we did in Theorem 1 for education policies such that 0 ￿ Ss (si) ￿ 1. However, even
in our very stylized set up that is not possible. We would always need to resort to numerical
comparison. The reason is that whilst the full record dully curbs incentives to study, when
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the government is free to pay agents more than their investment cost, a minimum level of
schooling may be implemented without distortion. Thus, only the agency problem is left
and the loss from separating types is considerably lower. It may continue to be the case that
the gains from full insurance in the second period outweigh the costs from distortions during
youth. If that happens, limited record harms social welfare. Yet, take any parameterization
of the model for which pooling is better than separation under full record. Then, limited
record is certainly welfare improving, as a pooled solution is always feasible in the social
programme (2.16).
Theorem 2: If education policy is unrestricted when governments lack commitment, the
limited record keeping is not necessarily a welfare improving ￿scal constitution. There is,
however, an open set of parameters for which the utilitarian social welfare is still higher
under limited record - Ti = T (Yi) - than under full record - Ti = T (si;Yi): For all para-
meterizations, non-revealing mechanisms are necessarily suboptimal if limited record may be
credibly implemented.
Notice that the higher the complementarity between ability and education in the skill
function, ceteris paribus, the more likely it is that the economy is better o⁄ restricting
income taxes to depend on income only. Not only low type agents gain less from mimicking
in the ￿rst period but also the second period allocation is closer to a ￿rst best. In other
words, the same schooling levels (s1;s2) entails less distortionary costs of redistribution. As
a consequence, the opportunity cost from not having a second period ￿rst best is lower.
Implementation
Like we did at the end of Section 5.1., we close our analysis with a proposal for the
decentralization of the time-consistent equilibrium under limited record.
By assumption, income taxes must be irresponsive to the education levels. Furthermore,
the tax schedule has to create the labor wedges enunciated in Proposition 5. As it is well
known, the following tax system implements the social optimum (co
1;Y1;co
2;Y2) :
e T (Y ) =
(
Tlow; if Y ￿ Y2
Thigh; otherwise
:
Tlow and Thigh are set exactly so that the individual budget constraints are met with
equality at the socially optimal allocation. No individual will have an incentive to choose
anything other than the allocation intended for her by the policy maker. Like in the perfect
redistribution equilibrium characterized in Lemma 1, it induces type 1 agents to pay higher
taxes than type 2 agents, but consumption levels are not equalized.
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Consider that
@( s= )





2 (0;1); for agents of type 2, 1 ￿ MRSs2;co
2 = 0: Since the marginal value
of schooling is always strictly positive from an individual point of view [consider expression
(2.5) with any non-negative Ss (si) and Ts (si;Yi) = 0], the policy maker does not need to
impose each single unit of investment in human capital on the agent, as it did in Section
2.5.1. The subsidy schedule may actually take a similar form to that of the income tax one:
e S (s) =
(
Slow; if s < s1
Shigh; otherwise
:
Shigh is not necessarily higher than Slow [given the future tax schedule, high types do
prefer their recommended allocation] but is certainly such that the most talented spend a
bigger share of net resources on education. In fact, it is such that these individuals spend a
higher share of their own initial resources on education in equilibrium.




2;s2) is implemented and
induces (co
1;Y1;co
2;Y2) in the future given the structure of e T (Y ): By adjusting the subsidy
schedule and therefore agents￿optimal education investment, the ￿rst period government is
actually indirectly choosing e T (Y ), in both its cut o⁄ level and size of the transfers.
2.6 Conclusion
In this paper we considered a two-class economy where individual productivity is endoge-
nous and redistribution policy is chosen sequentially. We showed that a ￿scal constitution
precluding the dependence of income taxes on past education investment may improve utili-
tarian social welfare. In particular, when governments are constrained to subsidize education
at no more than 100% of its cost, the welfare gain is undoubtfully positive.
The limited record keeping institution would always be detrimental if governments could
comply to their promised tax schedules after a big time span, as it limits the possible shape of
￿scal instruments that can be used for redistribution. However, if governments reoptimize at
the beginning of each period it works as a partial commitment device, completely eliminating
the ratchet e⁄ect. In other words, it credibly stops future governments from exploiting
information collected through the adverse selection of young agents.
We use our setup to identify the two potential sources of time-inconsistency in the optimal
redistribution policy. Despite getting rid of the ratchet e⁄ect trough the limited record
institution, the benevolent policy maker still cannot restore the allocation it would choose
ex ante under commitment. Future governments will ignore the impact of income taxation
on past incentives to invest in human capital, perceiving a lower e¢ ciency cost for the same
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equity goals than they would a priori. That is an exact parallel to the time inconsistency
problem identi￿ed by Fischer (1980) for homogeneous agents economies.
Throughout our analysis we assumed a perfect correlation between education invest-
ment and e⁄ective productivity enhancement for a given cognitive ability. Arguably, the
relationship between the two is noisy, especially if what governments observe is only part
of total schooling investment. However, as long as there is some positive association our
main insights still go through. Measurable education expenditures will still be used as an
e¢ cient tagging device if governments are allowed to use it. Thus, individual agents are
disencouraged to raise them and that is harmful if these type of expenditures are strongly
complementary to non-observable educational e⁄ort.
2.7 Appendix
Individual problem of an agent of type i
A general speci￿cation of the ￿scal policy involves Si = S (si) and Ti = T (si;Yi): An





















i + si ￿ k0=2 + S (si); c
o
i ￿ Yi ￿ T (si;Yi);





k0 and ￿i are given.
Denoting ￿y;i and ￿o;i the multipliers for the budget constraints and assuming the solution




i) ￿ ￿y;i = 0

















+ ￿￿o;i (1 ￿ TY (si;Yi)) = 0;
which after rearranging terms yield expressions (2.3)-(2.4).￿







2;n1;n2) is a strictly concave function and all the binding constraints of
the ￿rst best programme are linear. Therefore, there is an unique solution to the problem. (i)
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and (ii) follow directly from ￿rst order conditions and the separability of the utility function.
To derive (iii) notice that the optimality condition for labor supply is ￿0 (ni) = ￿
￿  (￿i;si)
where ￿
￿ is the multiplier of the feasibility constraint. Thus, by the convexity of ￿ (￿);
 1 > (or =) 2 ) n1 > (or =)n2:
We prove ￿rst that n1 > n2: Suppose not: n1 ￿ n2: Then, it must be the case that s2 > s1
was chosen, otherwise it would be impossible to have   (￿1;s1) ￿   (￿2;s2): Knowing how
the optimal choice over labor supply hinges on the relationship between productivities, the
government could set a s0
2 and s0
1; such that   (￿1;s0
1) =   (￿2;s2) and   (￿2;s0
2) =   (￿1;s1):
The continuation value would be the same and in the ￿rst period there would be resources
relieved because  ￿ > 0 and  s￿ > 0;8s: These resources can then be used to increase
consumption and thus social welfare.
That said, it is left to show that n1 > n2 ) s1 > s2: To check it, note that the ￿rst order
condition with respect to schooling for each type i is ni s (￿i;si) = 1 + r - a non-arbitrage
condition. Since  ss < 0 and  s￿ > 0; n1 > n2 ) s1 > s2.￿
Proof of Proposition 2:
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= ￿=(1 + r)
equat. (2:7a); ￿;￿ > 0
0 < ￿ < 1 for interior consumption allocations. Therefore, optimality conditions for
consumption determine (i) and (ii). (iii) and (iv) follow from the conditions for (co
1;n1;s1)
Pereira, Joana (2009), Essays on Time-Consistent Fiscal Policy 
European University Institute
 
DOI: 10.2870/105672.7. APPENDIX 62
and (co
2;n2); respectively, and (v) is dictated by the comparison of FOCs for labor supply













 (￿1;s1) in equilibrium. These quantities
are equal in the ￿rst best, meaning that for the same skill levels   (￿1;s1) and   (￿2;s2);
n1=n2 is now lower.￿
Proof of Proposition 3:
When types are to be elicited at the beginning of each period, three potential incentive
compatibility constraints arise for each individual: mimicking in both periods, mimicking in
the ￿rst period only and mimicking in the second period only [equat. (2.9)]. It follows that
in "normal" redistributive equilibria with  1 ￿  2 and Y1 > Y2; (2.9) binds for i = 1 but
not for i = 2 by the convexity of ￿ (￿): The former also implies that: (i) individuals of type
1 prefer mimicking in both periods than in the ￿rst period only and (ii) individuals of type
2 prefer mimicking in the ￿rst period only than in the two periods. Finally, for s1 ￿ s2 only
























When this condition exactly binds, we have necessarily that highly able individuals are
not tempted to lie about their type in both periods. The reverse is not true; (2.17) always
binds.












































































for which ￿rst order conditions at interior equilibria are
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equat. (2:7a); ￿;￿;{ > 0
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= 1; (2.22)
upholding Lemma 3, as for s1 > s2 and as long as
@( s= )




2 are lower than 1.￿
Proof of Theorem 1:
The zero education result under full record and Ss (si) ￿ 1 follows from the discussion
in the text. The optimality conditions in the second period under perfect information [e.g.,
when in the ￿rst periods agents chose s1 6= s2] are such that u0(co
i) is constant - co
i =
co; 8i - and ￿0(ni) = u0(co
i) i [see proof of Proposition 1]. What is more, an increase in
income of a single individual has a negligible e⁄ect on total resources and consequentially on
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The social ￿rst order condition for individual labor supply ni completely de￿nes it as a
function of a variable that by the beginning of adulthood is exogenous -  i - for a given






i=co = u0(co)=￿00(u0(co) i) > 0; sustaining the negative sign of the expression above.
Since the marginal cost is weakly positive - u0(co
i)(1 ￿ Ss (si)) - the best response of each
individual agent to an expectation that others￿choices are such that second period policy
makers are fully informed is the corner solution si = 0: If 0 < si = s2, the second period
government is uninformed of types [knows only the distribution of  
0s]. Take an individual
agent of type 2 who chooses to instead set s to zero. Individuals with s = 0 are perfectly
identi￿able and therefore cannot mimic or be mimicked by other types with other levels
of observable schooling. The F.O.C.s for consumption in an economy with the 3 types
 1 >  2 >  , in which only the incentive compatibility constraint of the highest type

















 2: Since   <  2, n2 is necessarily higher than n . Type 2 individuals
would always prefer to change their education investment from s1 to zero, meaning that we
would be back to a s1 6= s2 situation, which as shown above is not an equilibrium.
When there is limited record keeping but the policy maker cannot commit to future

















2 ￿   (￿1;s1)n1 +   (￿2;s2)n2 + A(1 + r)
with W o (co
1;co
2;n1;n2) given as in (2.6) and   (￿1;s1);   (￿2;s2) not observable but which
distribution is know to the policy maker. First order conditions for consumption and labor
supply read [in equilibria with   (￿1;s1) ￿   (￿2;s2), (2:9) binds only for i = 1]:
(co
1;co
2) : u0 (co
1)(1 + e ￿) = u0 (co

































= 1 ￿ TY(Y2) < 1:
(2.24)
We characterize the lifetime equilibrium with limited record keeping in the absence of
education policy and show it renders higher welfare than the full record. When there is some
freedom in setting education subsidies [i.e., any schedule such that 0 ￿ Ss(i) ￿ 1] we are
necessarily weakly better o⁄ because not intervening is feasible a well.
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By (2.5) [which determines education choices], Ts(i) = Ss (i) = 0;8i and the assumptions
on the skill technology function, private agents choose fs1;s2g
￿ > 0: The ￿rst period gov-
ernment still optimizes over A, which in this case is determined by the optimality condition
[u0 (c
y
1) + u0 (c
y
2)]=2 = ￿ (1 + r)e ￿.
To compare social welfare as of date zero, ￿x the fs1;s2;Ag
￿ allocation and suppose
agents choose otherwise without government intervention. Given the in￿nite productivity
of the ￿rst units of schooling and the shape of   (￿), si = 0 is always worse than an in-
terior value of schooling - namely s￿
i - when agents may freely choose (ni;co
i); unless s￿
i
exhausts available resources in the ￿rst period [bringing u0(c
y
i) close to in￿nity]. The fact
that the ￿rst period government also sets A￿ such that [u0 (c
y
1) + u0 (c
y
2)]=2 = ￿ (1 + r)e ￿
necessarily eliminates such scenario. Furthermore, the implementation of a second best in







2;n1;n2) is necessarily higher in limited record than in full record when the
government lacks commitment and there is no education policy.
Finally, whatever the preferred tax schedule of an uncommitted government having to
comply with limited record, it is necessarily feasible for the committed government also facing
the limited record keeping restriction. Both are non-linear functions T(Y ), and for the same
tax schedule, the ￿rst period preferred plan for education would be necessarily the same.
Therefore, second period feasibility would verify equally and the incentive compatibility
constraint (2.9) is exactly the same [see also section 5.3]. This means that the committed
government achieves at least the same level of welfare as the uncommitted. It will generally
do better because it optimizes also over incentives to invest in education in the ￿rst period
when setting T(Y ):￿
Proof of Proposition 4:
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 (￿i;si) ; 8i
and V
o;sep
A = u0 (co)(1 + r): Substituting and rearranging terms, and having into account that
￿sep
y < 1 is necessary to meet condition (2.12), we obtain
u0 (c
y























































1;n1) > U (c
y
2;co
2;n2) holds when (2.12) is met with equality.￿
Proof of Proposition 5: V o;lr (s1;s2;A) is the indirect utility derived from a programme
equivalent to (2.23). With   (￿1;s1) >   (￿2;s2); the ￿rst order conditions are also the




1 = 1 and ￿MRSY2;co
2 < 1: The expression for
￿MRSY2;co
2 may be contrasted to (2.21). There we ￿nd the last term in the denominator
concerning the impact of Y2 on ￿rst period incentive constraints, which does not show up in
this government￿ s problem.
Using the envelope theorem we ￿nd the expressions for V o;lr





















































o is the multiplier to the second period incentive compatibility constraint. The ￿rst
order conditions for the social optimization problem (2.16) with respect to consumption and
schooling, after substituting for optimality in A, have exactly the same form as equations
(2.18)-(2.20) [substituting { by ￿lr
o and ￿ by the multiplier of the incentive compatibility
constraint in (2.16), ￿lr
y ]: Finally U (c
y
1;co
1;n1) > U (c
y
2;co
2;n2) always holds when both the
￿rst and second period incentive constraints hold with equality.￿
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MARKOV-PERFECT OPTIMAL FISCAL POLICY: THE
CASE OF UNBALANCED BUDGETS
3.1 Introduction
1In most developed economies, income tax rates and government debt levels are
positive and sizable. In the US, e⁄ective income tax rates have been in the order of 20%,
and outstanding public debt represents about 60% of GDP. The main question we pose in
this paper is: can these numbers be accounted for as the outcome of a government￿ s welfare
maximization program in a neoclassical economy? To address this question we adopt the
standard framework in the literature of optimal ￿scal policy, and drop the assumption of
government￿ s full commitment to future policies. Instead, we assume that the government
has no access to commitment devices nor to reputation mechanisms, and, therefore, we
restrict our attention to Markovian optimal policies. Our answer to the above question
is in the a¢ rmative, provided this is the policy expected by households and all successive
governments.
The observation of positive income taxes and, especially, of positive levels of public
debt has been at odds with most neoclassical theories of optimal ￿scal policy. Indeed,
the now classical result by Chamley (1986) and Judd (1985) establishes that a committed
government will not use distortionary taxation in the long run. The optimal policy set by
such a government involves high taxation in the short run in order to build up enough assets
to ￿nance future government expenditure, so that distortionary taxation can be disposed
of in the long run. In economies with government￿ s full commitment, this result has been
proved to be robust to a number of non-trivial departures from the standard framework.
In this paper, we study a neoclassical economy populated by in￿nitely-lived consumers,
competitive ￿rms operating a constant-returns-to-scale production technology, and a benev-
olent government. The government makes sequential decisions on the provision of a valued
public good, on income taxation and the issue of public debt. We characterize and compute
Markov-perfect optimal ￿scal policy in this economy with two payo⁄-relevant state variables:
physical capital and public debt. Other than imposing di⁄erentiable strategies, we do not
1This chapter is co-authored with Salvador Ortigueira.
70
Pereira, Joana (2009), Essays on Time-Consistent Fiscal Policy 
European University Institute
 
DOI: 10.2870/105673.1. INTRODUCTION 71
restrict further the de￿nition of Markov perfection. Hence, we look at all Markov-perfect
equilibria of the in￿nite-horizon economy, including those which are the limit of equilibria
of the ￿nite-horizon economy and those which only emerge with in￿nite horizons.
The main contribution of our analysis can be summarized as follows. In the class
of economies outlined above, optimal ￿scal policy in a Markov-perfect equilibrium is not
uniquely determined. We ￿nd two stable, steady-state equilibria: in one of them income
taxes and debt are positive, implying positive distortions to both the consumption/savings
and the private/public consumption margins. In the second equilibrium taxes are zero and
debt is negative, implying no distortions to these two margins. Moreover, in a calibrated
version of the model that matches key US observations, we show that a 20% income tax rate
and a debt-GDP ratio of 60% emerge as the long-run optimal ￿scal policy in the equilibrium
with positive distortions. We prove that convergence to either of the two long-run equilibria
is not pinned down by initial conditions but by expectations on government policy. That is,
Markov-perfect optimal ￿scal policy is driven by expectations.
In the economy of our model, the multiplicity of expectation-driven Markov-perfect equi-
libria does not arise if the government is required to balance its budget on a period-by-period
basis, in which case income taxation becomes the only source of government revenue. It is
only when governments are allowed to run unbalanced budgets and, therefore, to spread the
burden of ￿nancing the provision of the public good that expectations play a role in the
determination of optimal ￿scal policy. Thus, expectations that all future governments will
dispose of distortionary taxation if given enough assets to ￿nance the provision of the public
good, will render such a policy optimal. On the other hand, expectations that all govern-
ments will issue debt in order to pass on part of the burden of ￿nancing current expenditure
to the next government will lead to an optimal policy with income taxation, issues of debt
and, consequently, positive wedges. As we show below, the existence of this latter equilib-
rium hinges on the assumption that the economy runs for an in￿nite number of periods, and
therefore there is no last government unable to pass on the burden.2 A feature common to
the two equilibria is that governments use public debt to reduce long-run tax distortions, as
compared to the economy without debt.
In economies without capital, the existence of two steady-state Markov-perfect equilibria
has been recently shown by a number of authors. In these economies, however, equilibrium
dynamics are drastically di⁄erent from what we ￿nd in our economy with capital and debt.
2The expectational multiplicity of the equilibrium in our economy is thus of a di⁄erent nature to that
found by Calvo (1988) in a two-period economy with public debt and costly debt repudiation. This author
shows the existence of two expectation-driven equilibria: a ￿good" Pareto-e¢ cient equilibrium in which there
is no debt repudiation, and a ￿bad" Pareto-ine¢ cient equilibrium where debt is partially repudiated.
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Martin (2006) and D￿az-GimØnez, Giovannetti, Marimon and Teles (2006), study optimal mo-
netary policy in economies with debt and ￿nd two steady-state debt levels, only one of which
is stable. These authors show that the two steady states are generated by the same policy
function and, therefore, the Markov-perfect equilibrium is unique. Krusell, Martin and R￿os-
Rull (2006) study optimal debt policy in a model with exogenous government expenditure,
labor taxation and no capital. In their economy, the interior steady-state equilibrium with
positive distortions is unstable. The authors show that the equilibrium contains a large,
countable set of long-run debt levels. Initial conditions pin down the element in this set to
which the economy converges in a maximum of two periods.
Our paper builds on a large body of literature dealing with optimal ￿scal policy in
environments with no commitment. Thus, Markov-perfect optimal taxation in economies
without public debt has been ￿rst studied by Klein and R￿os-Rull (2003), Klein, Krusell and
R￿os-Rull (2006) and then by Ortigueira (2006). Indeed, our paper is an extension of the
framework presented in Klein, Krusell and R￿os-Rull (2006) to include public debt.
Our paper is also related to the work of Song, Storesletten and Zilibotti (2007) who
study optimal ￿scal policy in economies where subsequent generations of agents (young
and old) vote on policy. These authors focus on the Markov-perfect political equilibrium
in an economy without physical capital and ￿nd that the long-run level of debt depends
crucially on the distortions brought about by labor taxation. When these distortions are
large enough debt converges to an interior value, otherwise debt accumulation depletes the
economy. Debortoli and Nunes (2007) assume political disagreement (i.e. policymakers have
di⁄erent preferences on the type of public good that should be provided) as in Alesina and
Tabellini (1990) and Persson and Svensson (1989) and study the evolution of public debt
under di⁄erent degrees of commitment. Abstracting from physical capital, the authors show
that it is political disagreement what explains positive values of long-run debt.
A di⁄erent body of literature has developed after the paper by Lucas and Stokey (1983),
who study the role of public debt as a substitute for commitment in Ramsey economies
without capital. They show that the Ramsey policy is consistent if governments can commit
to inherited debt contracts. Speci￿cally, they show that future governments will comply with
the ￿scal plans chosen today if the current government delegates rich enough state-contingent
multiple-period debt contracts. Later, Persson, Persson and Svenson (1988) extend this line
of research to monetary policy inconsistency. Finally, Aiyagari, Marcet, Sargent and Sep-
p￿l￿ (2002) modify the Stokey and Lucas (1993) model by dropping the complete markets
assumption, which introduces a history dependence on the debt path, as opposed to a con-
tingency to future states. They show that when there are no exogenous bounds on debt the
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Ramsey planner in their economy lets public debt converge to a negative level.
The chapter is organized as follows. Section 3.2 presents the model, characterizes
Markov-perfect equilibria and shows the existence of the two steady states. In Section 3.3
we parameterize and calibrate our model economy and compute Markov-perfect equilibrium.
We also compare Markovian policies with those arising in the e¢ cient and the Ramsey equi-
librium. Section 3.4 presents a description of our numerical algorithm. Section 3.5 concludes
and Section 3.6 contains the Appendix.
3.2 The Model
Our framework is the standard, non-stochastic neoclassical model of capital accu-
mulation, extended to include a benevolent government that provides a valued public good.
In order to ￿nance the provision of such public good the government can levy a tax on
household￿ s income and issue public debt. Thus, ￿scal policy in each period consists of the
amount of the public good provided, Gt, the tax rate on income, ￿t, and the issue of public
debt, Bt+1, which matures in period t + 1.
We begin by describing the problem solved by each agent in this economy. We then
characterize the ￿scal policy set by the benevolent government lacking the ability to commit
to future policies. In order to help compare our results with the case of full commitment,
we also present a brief review of ￿scal policy in the Ramsey equilibrium.
3.2.1 Households
There is a continuum of homogeneous households with measure one. Each household
supplies one unit of labor and chooses consumption and savings in order to maximize lifetime









ct + kt+1 + bt+1 = kt + bt + (1 ￿ ￿t)[wt + (rt ￿ ￿)kt + qtbt] ::: 8t (3.2)
k0 > 0 and b0 given,
where small letters are used to denote individual variables and capital letters to denote
economy-wide values. Function U(￿) in equation (3.1) is the instantaneous utility function,
which depends on the consumption of a private good, ct, and the consumption of a public
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good, Gt. U(￿) is assumed to be continuously di⁄erentiable, increasing and concave; and
0 < ￿ < 1 is the discount factor. Labor is supplied inelastically at a real wage rate wt.
Household￿ s asset holdings are made up of physical capital, kt, which is rented to ￿rms at
the rate rt, and government￿ s bonds, bt, which bear an interest denoted by qt. Physical
capital depreciates at a rate denoted by 0 < ￿ < 1. Household￿ s total income, net of capital
depreciation, is taxed at the rate ￿t. If the government is a net lender to the private sector
￿ i.e., the household borrows from the government, bt < 0￿ taxable income is net of interest
payments.
3.2.2 Firms
Firms are competitive and produce an aggregate good with a neoclassical production
technology. Total production is given by,
Yt = F(Kt;Lt) = F(Kt;1) = f(Kt) 8t; (3.3)
where Kt denotes the aggregate or economy-wide stock of capital and we have f0(Kt) >
0; f00(Kt) < 0. First-order conditions to pro￿ts maximization imply the typical demand and
zero-pro￿ts equations,
rt = fK(Kt) (3.4)
wt = f(Kt) ￿ rtKt: (3.5)
3.2.3 Government
Government￿ s ￿scal policy involves the setting of both the provision of the public
good and its ￿nancing through taxes and debt. The government is benevolent in the sense
that it seeks to maximize households￿lifetime utility, (3.1), subject to its budget constraint,
to a feasibility restriction, and to private sector￿ s ￿rst-order conditions. In addition, govern-
ment￿ s policies may be conditioned by its lack of commitment. The budget constraint of the
government is,
Gt + (1 + qt)Bt = Bt+1 + ￿t [wt + (rt ￿ ￿)Kt + qtBt]; (3.6)
where the right-hand side of equation (3.6) represents government￿ s revenues, which are
made up of the issue of debt, Bt+1, plus revenues from income taxation. The left-hand side
is government￿ s total expenditure, including the provision of the public good, the repaying
of outstanding public debt and ￿nancial expenses.
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3.2.4 Ramsey Optimal Fiscal Policy
This Section presents a brief review of the Ramsey ￿scal policy in our model economy.
In a Ramsey equilibrium, the benevolent government is assumed to have full commitment to
future policies, and, thus, it can credibly announce the whole sequence of public expenditure,
income taxes and issues of debt from the ￿rst period onwards. This allows the government
to anticipate the response of the private sector to its ￿scal policy. Hence, the problem of the
government in the Ramsey equilibrium is to choose sequences for taxes and public debt so
that the competitive equilibrium maximizes social welfare [equation (1.1)].
Proposition 1 below presents the optimal ￿scal policy in the steady-state Ramsey equi-
librium for our economy. Since the result in Proposition 1 is well known in the literature of
optimal ￿scal policy we only provide a sketch of the proof (see the Appendix).
Proposition 1: In the steady-state Ramsey equilibrium the tax rate on income is zero and
the government holds positive assets, i.e. B < 0.
3.2.5 Markov-Perfect Optimal Fiscal Policy
In this Section we drop the assumption of government￿ s full commitment to future
policies and study time-consistent optimal policies. More speci￿cally, we will focus on di⁄er-
entiable Markov-perfect equilibria of this economy populated by a continuum of households
and a government that acts sequentially, foreseeing its future behavior when choosing current
levels of the public good, income taxes and the issue of debt. The restriction to di⁄eren-
tiable Markov-perfect policies is justi￿ed by our use of calculus in the characterization of the
equilibria. A further remark on the assumption of di⁄erentiability will follow below.
Following the literature on Markovian policies, we assume that the government ￿
although unable to commit to future policies￿ , does commit to honoring the tax rate it
announces for the current period, and to repaying outstanding debt obligations. The com-
mitment to current taxes implies an intra-period timing of actions that grants the government
leadership in the setting of the tax rate. That is, at the beginning of period t, the time-t gov-
ernment sets the tax rate for the period; next, once that choice is publicly known, consumers
choose consumption/savings and the composition of their portfolios, and the government
chooses the provision of the public good (or equivalently, the issue of debt). Governments
are thus (intra-period) Stackelberg players and can therefore anticipate the e⁄ects of current
taxation on household￿ s decisions.
In sum, we assume that the time-t government has intra-period commitment to time-t
taxes but not to debt issues. In our opinion, this ￿ts well the timing of actions in real
economies, where, typically, governments make decisions on taxes at discrete times but issue
Pereira, Joana (2009), Essays on Time-Consistent Fiscal Policy 
European University Institute
 
DOI: 10.2870/105673.2. THE MODEL 76
debt continuously. [For a discussion on the e⁄ects of the timing of actions on Markovian
policies see Ortigueira (2006).]
The optimization problem of a typical household
The household chooses (i) how much to consume and save; and (ii) how to allocate
savings between physical capital and public debt. At the time the household makes these
decisions the tax rate for the period is known, but it must foresee both the current govern-
ment￿ s debt policy and future governments￿￿scal policy.
Hence, the problem of a household that holds k and b of the physical and government
assets, respectively, that has to pay taxes on current income at rate ￿, that expects the current
and future governments to issue new debt according to the policy  B : (K ￿ B ￿ ￿) ! B0,
and expects future governments to set taxes according to the policy  ￿ : (K ￿ B) ! ￿, can
be written as,
v(k;b;K;B;￿) = max








0 = k + b + (1 ￿ ￿)[w(K) + [r(K) ￿ ￿]k + q(K)b];
where ~ v(k0;b0;K0;B0) is the continuation value as foreseen by the household. !(K);r(K) and
q(K) are pricing functions. The economy-wide stock of physical capital is expected to evolve
according to the law K0 = H(K;B;￿), say. By using the assumption of a representative
agent, i.e., k = K and b = B, and the government￿ s budget constraint, it follows from the
above maximization problem that the consumption function in a competitive equilibrium
￿ where today￿ s tax rate is ￿, future taxes are set according to policy  ￿ and current and
futures issues of debt are set according to policy  B￿ can be expressed in terms of K;B
and ￿, say C(K;B;￿), and must satisfy the following Euler equation,




0)[1 + (1 ￿ ￿
0)(fK(K
0) ￿ ￿)]; (3.8)
where B0 =  B(K;B;￿) and ￿0 =  ￿(K0;B0). In equilibrium K0 is given by,
K
0 = K + B + (1 ￿ ￿)[f(K) ￿ ￿K + q(K)B] ￿ C (K;B;￿) ￿ B
0; (3.9)
where G and G0 are given by the time-t and time-(t + 1) governments￿budget constraints,
respectively. Finally, pricing functions !(K) and r(K) are given by (3.4) and (3.5), and
q(K) must satisfy the non-arbitrage condition between the two assets,
q(K) = fK(K) ￿ ￿: (3.10)
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In equilibrium, capital and debt yield the same return, meaning that q is independent of
B. The fact that the interest rate on public debt is independent of B implies an important
departure from economies without physical capital. We will comment further on this issue
below.
Equation (3:8) has the usual interpretation: the marginal utility of consumption equals
the present value of the last unit of income devoted to savings. Since physical capital and debt
yield the same return in equilibrium, the supply of public debt determines the composition
of the household￿ s portfolio. This implies a one-to-one crowding out of investment in capital
by public debt. Taxation, on the other hand, a⁄ects disposable income and the level of
consumption, and thus translates into a non-one-to-one crowding out of capital investment.
The problem of the government is shown next.
The problem of the government
As explained above, the government￿ s lack of commitment to future policies and our
focus on Markov-perfect equilibria allows us to think of the government as a sequence of
governments, one for each time period. Thus the time-t government sets the tax rate for the
period and issues new debt foreseeing the ￿scal policy to be set by successive governments.
Following the timing of actions established above, the time-t government is an intra-period
Stackelberg player in our economy: At the beginning of the period, it chooses the income tax
rate for that period taking into account the e⁄ect of ￿ on the level of consumption, as given
by the consumption function, C(K;B;￿), that solves (3.8) and (3.9). In a second stage, the
government sets the issue of debt. The problem of the government is thus solved backwards.
Given the initial choice for taxes, the issue of debt is the solution to,
V (K;B;￿) = max
B0
n







0 = (1 ￿ ￿)K + f(K) ￿ C(K;B;￿) ￿ G
G = ￿ [f(K) ￿ ￿K + q(K)B] + B
0 ￿ [1 + q(K)]B;
and equation (3.10);
where V (K;B;￿) is the value to the time-t government that has set the tax rate at ￿ and
foresees the ￿scal policy to be set by future governments. ~ V (K0;B0) is next-period value as
foreseen by the time-t government. The issue of debt that solves this problem can thus be
written as B0(K;B;￿). Therefore, the tax rate set by the time-t government is the solution
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0 = (1 ￿ ￿)K + f(K) ￿ C(K;B;￿) ￿ G
G = ￿ [f(K) ￿ ￿K + q(K)B] + B
0 (K;B;￿) ￿ [1 + q(K)]B;
and equation (3.10):
The following proposition characterizes the ￿scal policy set by the time-t government.
Proposition 2: The tax and debt policy that solves the government￿ s problem is the solution




























































Proof: See the Appendix.
Some comments on notation are in order. Function arguments in equations (3.13) and
(3.14) have been omitted for expositional clarity. Subscripts denote the variable with respect
to which the derivative is taken. A prime in a variable indicates next-period values, and a
prime in a function indicates it is evaluated at next-period variables. Finally, G￿ and GB
denote the derivatives of G with respect to ￿ and B, respectively, holding B0 constant.
Before providing an interpretation of the two Generalized Euler Equations presented
in Proposition 2, we o⁄er the following de￿nition. A Markov-perfect equilibrium in our
economy can be loosely de￿ned as:
De￿nition: A Markov-perfect equilibrium is a quadruplet of functions C(K;B;￿),  B(K;B;￿),
 ￿(K;B) and W(K;B), such that:
(i) Given  B and  ￿, C(K;B;￿) solves the household￿ s maximization problem.
(ii) Given C(K;B;￿),  B and  ￿ solve the government￿ s maximization problem. That is,
B0 =  B(K;B;￿) and ￿ =  ￿(K;B).
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(iii) W(K;B) is the value function of the government.
The two Generalized Euler Equations, (3.13) and (3.14), which characterize Markov-
perfect taxation and debt policies, respectively, have the following interpretation. Equation
(3:13) establishes that the tax rate has to equate the marginal value of taxation to the
marginal value of investing in physical capital. Equation (3.14) establishes that the issue of
debt has to equate the marginal value of issuing debt to the marginal value of investing in
physical capital (and consequently to the marginal value of taxation). In a Markov-perfect
equilibrium, the government is indi⁄erent between using taxes or debt to ￿nance the provision
of the public good. Both equations involve only wedges between today and tomorrow, as
posterior wedges are implicitly handled optimally by an envelope argument. Consecutive
governments, however, disagree on how much to tax tomorrow [the time-(t+1) government
does not internalize the distortionary e⁄ects of its policy on time-t investment]. The current
government thus takes into account the e⁄ect of its policy on tomorrow￿ s initial conditions,
K0 and B0, in order to help compensate for that disagreement. Following this reasoning, one
may interpret the di⁄erent terms in (3.13) and (3.14) as follows.
The left-hand side of equation (3.13) is today￿ s marginal utility of taxation per unit
of savings crowded out. The numerator of this expression is the change in utility from a
marginal increase in the tax rate, which is made up of the change in utility from the private
good, UcC￿, plus the change in utility from the public good, UGG￿. The denominator is the
amount of savings crowded out, or, equivalently, the change in consumption of the public
and private good brought about by the increase in the tax rate.
The right-hand side of equation (3.13) is the marginal utility of investing in physical
capital. An extra unit of investment today yields an increase in resources tomorrow by
f0
K0 +1￿￿. The breakdown of the value of these resources is: (i) C0
K0 of them are consumed
as private good, yielding a value of U0
c0C0
K0; (ii) G0
K0 corresponds to the increase in the
provision of the public good obtained from the increase in the tax base, which yields a value
of U0
G0G0
K0; (iii) the remaining f0
K0+1￿￿￿C0
K0￿G0
K0 are taxed away, and the marginal value
is the left-hand side of equation (3.13), updated one period ahead. Hence, the right-hand
side of (3.13) results from adding up all these values and discounting.
Equation (3.14) is a non-arbitrage condition between taxation and public debt, and its
interpretation is equally straightforward. The right-hand side is the value of issuing an
extra unit of government debt today. The ￿rst term on the right-hand side is the value of
today￿ s extra public good ￿nanced with the increase in government debt. The second term
is the present value of the implied changes in tomorrow￿ s consumption of the private and
public good, C0
B0 and G0
B0, respectively. Besides the direct e⁄ects on tomorrow￿ s utility, these
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changes have an e⁄ect on tomorrow￿ s taxation, which must be valued using the marginal
utility of taxation. Equation (3.14) establishes that the value of issuing debt must equal the
value of taxation (the left-hand side of the equation).
A re-arrangement of equation (3:14) o⁄ers an alternative interpretation of the non-
arbitrage condition between taxes and bonds in terms of two wedges, Uc￿UG and U0
c0 ￿U0
G0.

























Equation (2.15) says that the value of using debt instead of taxes to ￿nance the last
unit of public expenditure equals zero in a Markov-perfect equilibrium. The ￿rst term is
the net change in utility today of using debt instead of taxes per unit of forgone savings.
The second term captures the change in future distortions induced by the extra unit of
public debt. The way the current government trades o⁄these two wedges when choosing B0
depends on expectations on future government policy. As will become clearer below, there
is an equilibrium policy which renders a non-zero wedge Uc ￿ UG in the long run.
3.2.5.1 Steady-State Markov-Perfect Equilibrium
A steady-state Markov-perfect equilibrium is de￿ned as a list of in￿nite sequences for
quantities fCtg, fKtg, ￿scal variables, fGtg, f￿tg, fBtg and prices f!tg, frtg, and fqtg such
that they are generated by a Markov-perfect equilibrium, and its values do not change over
time, i.e. Kt+1 = Kt; Bt+1 = Bt; ￿t+1 = ￿t for all t, and the same is true for consumption
and prices.
In this subsection we o⁄er some insights on the steady-state Markov-perfect equilibrium
of our model economy, and prove three propositions. A ￿rst insight is related to the existence
of two di⁄erent steady-steady Markov-perfect equilibria. Evaluating equation (2.15) at a















This equation suggests that there may be two di⁄erent taxation and debt policies con-
sistent with the existence of a steady-state Markov-perfect equilibrium. The ￿rst one corre-
sponds to the policy prescribed by the long-run Ramsey equilibrium. As shown in Proposi-
tion 1, the Ramsey equilibrium prescribes zero income taxes and positive government asset
holdings in the steady state. The provision of the public good is ￿nanced entirely from the
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returns on government￿ s assets, and therefore, Uc = UG. The next proposition proves that
this policy is a Markov-perfect equilibrium.
Proposition 3: The steady-state Ramsey equilibrium is a Markov-perfect equilibrium.
Proof: See Appendix.
In a related paper, Azzimonti-Renzo, Sarte and Soares (2006) study a model with di⁄er-
entiated taxes on capital and labor, and exogenous government expenditure. Within their
framework, the authors ￿nd a Markov-perfect equilibrium which yields zero labor taxes from
all initial conditions, K and B, and zero capital taxes from next-period onwards. As con-
￿rmed by our numerical computations, this result also holds in our model economy: when
there are no exogenous bounds on income taxation, there exists a Markov-perfect equilib-
rium in which income taxes are zero after one period, and government assets converge to
the long-run Ramsey value. Furthermore, for some initial conditions the initial income tax
is negative, which amounts to a subsidy to households.
The second taxation and debt policy consistent with a steady-state Markov-perfect equi-
librium involves positive income taxes and the issuing of government￿ s bonds. Under this
policy Uc 6= UG, and the second term on the left-hand side of equation (3.16) is zero. The
next proposition presents an important feature of the steady-state Markov-perfect equilib-
rium with positive taxation.
Proposition 4: Along a steady-state Markov-perfect equilibrium with positive distortions,
government bonds are not net wealth, i.e., CB(K￿;B￿;￿￿) = 0.
Proof: See the Appendix.
Even though we do not have a formal proof establishing that the maximum number
of stable, interior steady-state equilibria is two, our numerical computations lead us to be
con￿dent that this is the case. Our exploration of di⁄erent subsets of the state space produced
only a steady-state equilibrium with positive taxation and public debt.
The existence of two stable, steady-state equilibria raises a question concerning equi-
librium dynamics from initial values K0 and B0. Proposition 5 below proves that the gov-
ernment￿ s policy rules generating the two steady states are di⁄erent, which implies that
steady-state multiplicity is expectational. Therefore, given initial conditions K0 and B0,
expectations on government policy determine equilibrium dynamics and convergence to one
of the two long-run equilibria. The basic idea of the proof relies on the fact that the steady-
state equilibrium with positive distortions is not the limit of the ￿nite-horizon economy￿ s
Markov-perfect equilibrium as the time horizon goes to in￿nity. Actually, we show that the
steady-state equilibrium with no distortions is the only limit of the ￿nite-horizon equilibrium.
Proposition 5: The two steady-state Markov-perfect equilibria are not associated with the
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same pair of decision rules  ￿ and  B. Hence, given K0 and B0, the Markov-perfect equi-
librium is (globally) indeterminate.
Proof: See the Appendix.
The next section presents a numerical analysis of the global dynamic properties of the
steady-state Markov-perfect equilibrium with positive distortions.
3.3 The Markov-Perfect Equilibrium in a Calibrated Economy
In this section we parameterize our model economy, set values to its parameters and
compute Markov-perfect equilibria. A special attention will be devoted to the presentation
of the Markov-perfect equilibrium rendering distortinary taxation and positive debt in the
long run. We also compare Markov-perfect equilibria to the e¢ cient solution (lump-sum
taxation). Finally, we solve for the Markov-perfect equilibrium under balanced budgets and
compare the results to the Ramsey and e¢ cient solutions. A detailed explanation of our
computational approach can be found in the next section.




(c G￿)1￿￿ ￿ 1
1 ￿ ￿
; (3.17)
where 0 < ￿ < 1, and 1=￿ denotes the elasticity of intertemporal substitution of the compos-
ite good. The functional form for the production technology is the standard Cobb-Douglas
function, with ￿ denoting the capital￿ s share of income, i.e.,
f(K) = AK
￿; A > 0: (3.18)
Parameter values are set as follows. The constant in the production function, A, and the
inverse of the elasticity of intertemporal substitution, ￿, are both set equal to one. The value
of ￿ is set at 0.36, which is the capital￿ s share of income in the US economy; the depreciation
rate of capital is set at 0.09, which is a standard value in macroeconomic models; ￿ is set
a 0.96, and ￿ is 0.2 so that the public-to-private consumption ratio falls within the range
15 ￿ 30% for all equilibrium concepts mentioned above. These parameter values are in line
with those in Klein, R￿os-Rull and Krusell (2006), Ortigueira (2006) and many others.
We start by presenting steady-state values for macroeconomic aggregates and ￿scal policy
under three equilibrium concepts ￿ namely, the equilibrium with lump-sum taxes, the Ram-
sey equilibrium and the Markov-perfect equilibrium. Table 1 below presents these steady-
state values.
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E¢ cient No wedges (Ramsey) Positive wedges
Y 1.7608 1.7608 1.6934
K 4.8144 4.8144 4.3201
C 1.1063 1.1063 1.1017
G 0.2213 0.2213 0.2032
G=C 0.2 0.2 0.1844
￿ indet. 0 0.1905
B=Y indet. -3.015 0.5639
W -5.0157 -5.0157 -5.5525
Notes: Steady-state values and policy for the e¢ cient, Ramsey and Markov-perfect
equilibria.
The ￿rst column in Table 1 shows the e¢ cient equilibrium when lump-sum taxation is
avail-able. The second and third columns show the two long-run Markov-perfect equilibria.
The one in the second column is the equilibrium with zero wedges, which corresponds to
the Ramsey equilibrium. In this equilibrium, the government does not distort long-run
investment and sets income taxes equal to zero. Public expenditure is ￿nanced entirely from
the income generated by the assets owned by the government. That is, negative public debt
(positive asset holdings) is the only source of income for the government in this steady-state
equilibrium. In the calibrated economy the value of the assets held by the government is
larger than the assets held by the private sector, and more than three times the value of
output.
The steady-state Markov-perfect equilibrium with positive wedges is shown in the third
column of Table 1. In this equilibrium income is taxed at a rate of 19:05% and the debt-GDP
ratio is 56:39%. These numbers fall well within the range of observed values in the U.S. and
in most developed economies.
In our economy with physical capital accumulation and public debt, the con￿guration of
Markovian equilibria di⁄ers drastically from that of the economy without capital, studied by
Krusell, Martin and R￿os-Rull (2006). Contrary to their results, our steady-state equilibrium
with positive distortions is stable. I.e. there is a Markov-perfect equilibrium whose time
paths converge to this steady state, both for economies starting with debt levels below and
above the steady-state value. An explanation as to why the presence of physical capital
makes such an important impact in terms of equilibrium dynamics must be found in the
Pereira, Joana (2009), Essays on Time-Consistent Fiscal Policy 
European University Institute
 
DOI: 10.2870/105673.3. THE MARKOV-PERFECT EQUILIBRIUM IN A CALIBRATED ECONOMY 84
determination of the equilibrium interest rate on public debt. In our economy with capital,
the interest rate is independent of the level of outstanding debt and is pinned down by the
stock of capital. Thus, the current government can only a⁄ect next period￿ s interest rate
through the stock of capital. This is in contrast with the economy without capital where the
government nails down next period￿ s interest rate when setting today￿ s debt issuance.
Figures 1 to 7 below display equilibrium dynamics converging to the Markov-perfect
equilibrium with long-run distortions.3 (Details on our method to compute Markov-perfect
equilibria can be seen below and in the next section.) Figures 1 to 3 show government￿ s
optimal ￿scal policy along the Markov-perfect equilibrium converging to the steady state in
the last column of Table 1. The optimal income tax, as a function of K and B, is shown in
Figure 1. The tax rate increases both with capital and debt. Figure 2 shows government￿ s
debt policy. The issue of debt decreases sharply with capital, indicating that capital-rich
economies rely relatively less on public debt to ￿nance government. Figure 3 shows public
expenditure as a function of K and B. The private-good consumption function is displayed
in Figure 4.
The stability of the steady-state is shown in Figures 5 to 7. Net investment in physical
capital, K0 ￿ K, is presented in Figure 5. In Figure 6 we plot the change in the level of
outstanding debt, B0 ￿B. Finally, Figure 7 presents the two loci, K0 = K and B0 = B. The
point in which these two loci intersect corresponds to the steady-state values for K and B.
The arrows indicate the direction of the trajectories starting in the di⁄erent regions of the
state space.
It should be noted that the Markov-perfect equilibrium shown in Figures 1 to 7 has been
computed using a global method. It becomes evident from a simple inspection of the Euler
equation and the two Generalized Euler equations that the standard method of linearizing
around steady-state values cannot be applied in our setting. Indeed, the equilibrium must be
computed without prior knowledge of steady-state values. Thus, the subset of the state space
must be changed in a trial-and-error process until it contains the steady-state equilibrium.
Before moving on to the next section where we explain our computation strategy, we draw
attention to Figures 8 to 11 below. Figures 8, 9 and 10 plot relative residuals in the Euler
equation and the two Generalized Euler equations, respectively. Figure 11 shows relative
residuals in the Bellman equation. It should be noted that the errors are very small, less
than 0:001 of 1 per cent. In addition to this, the errors nearly satisfy the equioscillation
property (the sign of the errors alternates between positive and negative), and show almost
3Equilibrium dynamics converging to the steady state without distortions are not presented here as they
are well known from the literature on Ramsey optimal policy. (See the paragraph following Proposition 3.)
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equal amplitude throughout the considered subset of the state space. All these properties
of the errors indicate that our approximations are close to being optimal, in the sense that
there are no better polynomials to approximate the unknown functions.
3.3.1 The Role of Debt in the Markov-Perfect Equilibrium
We now assess the role of public debt in economies without commitment. We present
steady-state values for the three equilibrium de￿nitions when governments are restricted to
run balanced budgets. Table 2 below shows these values.
Table 2
Steady-State Equilibria with balanced budgets
E¢ cient Ramsey Markov-perfect
Y 1.7608 1.7011 1.6710
K 4.8144 4.3742 4.1632
C 1.1063 1.0895 0.9911
G 0.2213 0.2179 0.3052
G=C 0.2 0.2 0.3079
￿ T = G 0.1666 0.2354
W -5.0157 -5.4756 -6.1565
Notes: Steady-state values and policy for the e¢ cient, Ramsey and Markov-perfect
equilibria in the economy with balanced budgets.
As discussed above, the multiplicity of Markov-perfect equilibria does not hold in the
economy with balanced budgets. The unique long-run Markov-perfect equilibrium in the
economy without debt is shown in the third column of Table 2. This Markov-perfect equilib-
rium yields higher income taxes, underconsumption of the private good and overconsumption
of the public good. Actually, the G=C ratio in the Markovian economy is 50% larger than
in the e¢ cient equilibrium, and the capital stock is 15% lower. The proneness of Markovian
governments to overspend and overtax in the economy without debt is especially acute due
to: (i) their lack of ability to internalize the distortionary e⁄ects of current taxation on past
investment, and (ii) their leadership to set taxes before households choose consumption,
which allows them to anticipate the response of current consumption to taxes, and then
diminishing the perceived crowding out of physical investment.
Public debt plays a key role curbing the tendency of Markovian governments to overtax
in the long run. In the steady-state Markov-perfect equilibrium with distortionary taxa-
tion the G=C ratio is 0:1844 (see Table 1), which amounts to a 40% decrease with respect
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to the economy without debt. The ratio of total government expenditures [including the
net service of debt] is still higher than the ￿rst best ￿ it is almost 23%￿ , but this still
represents a considerably lower weight of government spending in the economy. Likewise,
private consumption and capital are brought up closer to the e¢ cient allocation. The ability
of Markovian governments to issue debt is thus bound to have sizable positive e⁄ects on
welfare.
3.4 Numerical Approach
In this section we outline our strategy for the computation of the Markov-perfect equi-
librium. The ￿rst challenge in the computation of the three unknown functions C(K;B;￿),
 ￿(K;B), and  B(K;B;￿) stems from the presence of the derivatives of the consumption
function in the two generalized Euler equations, (3.13) and (3.14). In a steady state, these
derivatives must be solved for, thus making the number of unknowns exceed the number of
equations.
Our computational method is an application of a projection method which approximates
the three unknown functions with a combination of Chebyshev polynomials. Within the class
of orthogonal polynomials, Chebyshev polynomials stand ut for its e¢ ciency to approximate
smooth functions.4 The unknown coe¢ cients in the approximate functions are then obtained
so that they satisfy the three Euler equations at some collocation points within a subset of
the state space, [Kmin;Kmax] ￿ [Bmin;Bmax].
Thus, we approximate functions for consumption, taxes and the issue of debt by:



























where ￿ij‘(K;B;￿) and ￿ij(K;B) are tensor products of univariate Chebyshev polynomi-
als, which form the multidimensional basis for approximation.5 For instance, ￿ij(K;B) =
4For a complete characterization of their properties and a rigorous exposition of projection techniques
see Judd (1992, 1998). For a previous application of these ideas to the computation of Markovian optimal
taxes see Ortigueira (2006).
5The debt policy function  B(K;B;￿) is approximated by ^  B(K;B;~ h) as ￿ may be replaced in the former
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￿i(K)￿j(B), with ￿i(K) denoting the Chebyshev polynomial of order i in K and ￿j(B)
the Chebyshev polynomial of order j in B. Since Chebyshev polynomials are only de-















Vectors~ a; ~ d; ~ h in (3:19)￿(3:21) are the unknown coe¢ cients, which are pinned down by
imposing that ^ C(K;B;￿;~ a); ^  ￿(K;B; ~ d) and ^  B(K;B;~ h) satisfy the three Euler equations
and the laws of motion at a number of collocation points. The number of collocation points
is set so that the number of equations equals the number of unknown coe¢ cients. In our
exercise we choose Chebyshev collocation. It should be noted that the approximation of the
debt policy, equation (3.21), embeds already the approximation of the tax policy in terms
of K and B. On the other hand, the approximation of the consumption function, (3.19),
must be done in terms of K, B and ￿, in order to obtain the derivatives of the consumption
function which show up in the Generalized Euler equations.
The value function, W(K;B), can then be easily computed as follows. Using the solutions
for consumption, taxation and the issue of debt, the value function is approximated by,








where the vector ~ e contains the unknown coe¢ cients in the value function, which are pinned
down so that (3.23) solves the government￿ s Bellman equation at a number of collocation
points.
3.5 Conclusions
This paper analyzes Markov-perfect optimal ￿scal policy in a neoclassical economy
with physical capital and public debt. We extend a recent literature on time-consistent poli-
cies to economies where the government chooses government expenditures and households
hold physical capital and public debt in their portfolios. Previous studies on Markov-perfect
policy abstract from either public debt, by assuming a government￿ s period-by-period bal-
anced budget constraint, or from physical capital, assuming that labor is the only factor of
production.
by  ￿(K;B). This tax policy function is set at the beginning of the period by the same government that
chooses  B(K;B;￿):
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We characterize and compute Markov-perfect optimal ￿scal policy in our model economy
and ￿nd two steady-state equilibrium con￿gurations. We prove that the steady-state Ramsey
equilibrium is a Markov-perfect equilibrium. In addition, our numerical computations ￿nd a
stable, steady-state Markov-perfect equilibrium with positive income taxation and positive
public debt. In a calibrated version of the model, this latter equilibrium yields an income
tax rate close to 20% and a debt-GDP ratio in the order of 60%. These numbers are in
line with those observed in most developed economies. Although the framework presented
in this paper displays an expectations-driven multiplicity of equilibria ￿ and thus fails to
provide predictions on optimal policy￿ we argue that it can however be useful as a positive
theory of ￿scal policy. That is, on how actual policies are determined. The equilibrium with
no distortions involves initial tax rates and levels of government asset holdings which may
not be feasible in most ￿scal constitutions. This could leave the equilibrium with positive
long-run distortions as the only Markov-perfect equilibrium of our economy.
Our framework is rather stylized. We have abstracted from endogenous labor supply to
focus instead on the role of public debt in economies where the government lacks the ability
to commit to future policies. Although endogenizing labor supply, and allowing then the
government to set di⁄erent taxes on capital and labor, would not change our results qualita-
tively, it might have important quantitative implications. However, the computational costs
associated with an extension of our framework in that direction are likely to be insurmount-
able. As it was made clear in Section 3.4, we are approximating three unknown functions
￿ consumption as a function of capital, debt and taxes, and two government policies as func-
tions of capital and debt￿ to solve three functional equations. Adding two new unknown
functions ￿ labor supply and the tax policy on labor￿ and two new functional equations
will impair the application of projection methods in our set-up.
3.6 Appendix
Proof of Proposition 1:
The problem solved by a government with full commitment is to set in￿nite sequences
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Ct + Kt+1 + Gt = f(Kt) + (1 ￿ ￿)Kt (3.25)
Gt + [1 + rt ￿ ￿]Bt = Bt+1 + ￿t[(rt ￿ ￿)(Kt + Bt) + !t] (3.26)
Uc(Ct;Gt) = ￿Uc(Ct+1;Gt+1)[1 + (1 ￿ ￿t+1)(rt+1 ￿ ￿)]; t = 0:::1; (3.27)
K0 and B0 are given.
After de￿ning new variables ~ rt ￿ (1 ￿ ￿t)(rt ￿ ￿) and ~ !t ￿ (1 ￿ ￿t)!t, and formulating
the problem of the government as choosing after-tax rental prices, the ￿rst-order condition
with respect to Kt+1 (by using the primal approach) can be written as,
￿t = ￿ [￿t+1(rt+1 ￿ ~ rt+1)) + ￿t+1(1 + rt+1 ￿ ￿)]; (3.28)
where ￿t and ￿t are Lagrange multipliers. Using the Euler equation, equation (6.5) in a
steady-state equilibrium is,
(￿ + ￿)(r ￿ ~ r) = 0; (3.29)
from which it follows that ￿ = 0 in the steady-state equilibrium, and, consequently, B < 0.
Proof of Proposition 2:
The ￿rst-order condition to B0 in government￿ s maximization problem (3:11) is given by,
UGGB0 ￿ ￿ ~ V
0
K0GB0 + ￿ ~ V
0
B0 = 0: (3.30)
The ￿rst-order condition to ￿ in government￿ s maximization (3:12) is,
UcC￿ + UG (G￿ + GB0B
0
￿) ￿ ￿ ~ V
0
K0 (C￿ + G￿ + GB0B
0




￿ = 0; (3.31)
which, after making use of (3.30), simpli￿es to,
UcC￿ + UGG￿ ￿ ￿ ~ V
0
K0 (C￿ + G￿) = 0: (3.32)
Envelope conditions, along with W(K;B) = ~ V (K;B), yield,
WK = UcCK + UGGK + ￿W
0
K0 [1 + fK ￿ ￿ ￿ CK ￿ GK] (3.33)
WB = UcCB + UGGB + ￿W
0
K0 [￿CB ￿ GB]: (3.34)
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Forwarding these envelope conditions one period and using the above ￿rst-order con-
ditions, we obtain the two Generalized Euler Equations, (3:13) and (3:14); presented in
Proposition 2.
Proof of Proposition 3:
As shown in Proposition 1, in a steady-state Ramsey equilibrium income taxes are zero
and the government holds negative debt (assets) to ￿nance the provision of the public good.
The government does not rely on distortionary taxation, and the e¢ ciency condition, Uc =
UG, is attained. In this proof we show that the system of equations characterizing steady-
state Markov-perfect equilibria has a solution with these properties.
Let us start by assuming that Uc = UG. Then, from (3.32) it follows that Uc = ￿WK.
From (3.34) it is then easy to see that WB = 0. Finally, equation (3.33) becomes,
1
￿
= 1 + fK ￿ ￿; (3.35)
which, along with the consumer￿ s Euler equation, implies that ￿ = 0.
Proof of Proposition 4:
The proof follows directly from the ￿rst-order and envelope conditions presented above,
along with the non-arbitrage condition. Thus, by plugging the ￿rst-order condition to issues
of debt evaluated at a steady-state Markov-perfect equilibrium into (3.34), it obtains that
at a steady-state equilibrium,
(1 + ￿GB)WB = (Uc ￿ UG ￿ ￿WB)CB: (3.36)
Then, plugging GB = ￿(1 ￿ ￿)q ￿ 1 and the non-arbitrage condition, q = fK ￿ ￿; into
equation (3.36) and using the household￿ s Euler equation, it follows that CB = 0 at the
steady state.
Proof of Proposition 5:
Here we prove that the two steady-state equilibria ￿ one with positive distortions and
one without￿ are not associated with the same pair of decision rules  ￿ and  B. To do this,
we show that the policy rules generating the steady state with no distortions are the only
limit of policy rules in the ￿nite-horizon economy as the planning horizon goes to in￿nity.
The proof, although algebraically tedious, is straightforward.
In the ￿nite-horizon economy with last period denoted by T, we have KT+1 = BT+1 = 0.
Therefore, in period T households simply consume all their resources. The problem of the
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CT = KT + BT + (1 ￿ ￿T)[f(KT) ￿ ￿KT + qTBT] (3.37)
GT = ￿T [f(KT) ￿ ￿KT + qTBT] ￿ (1 + qT)BT: (3.38)
The ￿rst-order condition to this problem is,
Uc(T) = UG(T); (3.39)
where Uc(T) denotes Uc(CT;GT).
In period T ￿ 1, the households￿Euler equation is,
Uc(CT￿1;GT￿1) = ￿Uc(CT;GT)[1 + (1 ￿ ￿T)(fK (KT) ￿ ￿)]; (3.40)
and the non-arbitrage condition between the two assets is qT = fK (KT)￿￿: The ￿scal policy
chosen by the time-(T￿1) government is obtained in a two-step maximization problem. First,





GT￿1 = BT + ￿T￿1 [f(KT￿1) ￿ ￿ + qT￿1BT￿1] ￿ (1 + qT￿1)BT￿1 (3.41)
KT = f(KT￿1) + (1 ￿ ￿)KT￿1 ￿ GT￿1 ￿ CT￿1 (3.42)
and equations (3:37);(3:38);(3:39) and (3:40):































equations (3:37);(3:38);(3:39);(3:40);(3:41);(3:42) and (3:43):
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dBT = ￿1: Using these values in equations (3.43) and (3.44),
we have










dKT = 1 + fK (KT) ￿ ￿, equation (3.44) yields,
Uc(T ￿ 1) = ￿Uc(T)[1 + fK (KT) ￿ ￿]: (3.46)
From this equation and the household￿ s Euler equation it follows that ￿T = 0.
Solving the problem for period T ￿ 2, yields ￿T￿1 = 0. By proceeding in this way up to
the initial period, it can be shown that all taxes are zero but the initial one. That is, ￿0 6= 0
and ￿t = 0 for all t from 1 to T.
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Notes: Figures 1 to 4 show the policy functions in a Markov-perfect equilibrium. The
government￿ s tax policy is shown in Figure 1. The government￿ s debt policy is shown in
Figure 2. The government￿ s spending policy is displayed in Figure 3. Finally, the private
consumption function is shown in Figure 4.
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Figure 7. The  K ' = K  and  B ' = B  Loci
 steady-state
Notes: Figures 5 to 7 show the dynamics around the steady-state equilibrium with positive
income taxation. Figure 5 shows net investment; Figure 6 shows the change in government
debt; and Figure 7 shows the K0 = K and B0 = B loci.
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Notes: Figures 8 to 11 show relative errors of Chebyshev collocation for the Euler equation
(Figure 8), Generalized Euler equations (Figures 9 and 10) and the Bellman equation
(Figure 11).
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